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ABSTRACT 
Journalists are often presented with leaked information from whistleblowers. Having 
the information and writing the story, as well as handling a source that may or may 
not want to be anonymous, gives rise to ethical dilemmas on the part of the 
journalist. This was certainly true for journalists reporting on the political violence in 
South Africa during the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Journalists operate under 
codes of practice that are set by various media organisations and must ensure that 
in using whistleblower information to write their stories, “they must avoid breaches of 
ethics, fairness, factual accuracy and contextual accuracy” (Houston, B. et al., 2002: 
538). And most importantly, journalists are ethically bound to protect their sources. 
This research looks at the interaction between journalists and their sources of 
information in two major stories that involved the use of whistleblowers. It discusses 
and compares the issue of “source handling”, in the following two South African 
stories which used information leaked by whistleblowers:  
a. the 1991 “Inkathagate” story, which was broken by the Weekly Mail 
newspaper; 
b. “Vlakplaas” hit squad story, initially involving the Weekly Mail (20 October 
1989) and then Vrye Weekblad (November 1989). 
This study also brings into focus the issue of strengthening journalistic ethics in the 
South African context. It contends that the “Inkathagate” and “Vlakplaas” stories 
were dependent on the verification of the information, as well as the ethical handling 
of the whistleblowers.  This study raises questions about the motivations of the 
whistleblowers, their relationships with the journalists, as well as the critical role of 
the public’s “right to know”, or “public interest”.  
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2. INTRODUCTION  
Across the globe, media practitioners are grappling with the problem of 
strengthening ethics in journalism. Journalistic ethics has increasingly come under 
threat especially in the digital age. There is a very real concern about raising the bar 
on ethical journalistic practices, towards finding ways to encourage journalists to 
adopt better ethical standards and practices. The profession of journalism can 
certainly benefit from enhancing public respect for it, and giving journalists more 
reason for placing confidence in each other’s integrity. This is exemplified in the 
following statement from his keynote address at the FAIR Pan African Investigative 
Journalism summit, where Gerard Guedegbe stated: “Media everywhere should 
define its own space, one that is empowered and self-sufficient, and able to face the 
world on its own terms, and there is no reason why African media should be an 
exception” (2009: 56).  
In a post-1994 democratic South Africa, media practitioners have been debating the 
issue of strengthening journalistic ethics in an evolving media landscape. In 1998, 
the South African Human Rights Commission (HRC) held an inquiry into alleged 
racism in the media. This media inquiry “supported the perception that the South 
African media cannot be trusted and should be monitored” (Retief, 2002: ix). Retief 
pointed to several reasons that could be “advanced for this state of affairs: a blatant 
indifference concerning the importance of practising journalism in a responsible way; 
sheer ignorance; the lack of codes of ethics in certain media circles; even where 
codes of ethics are in existence, they are not always used to good effect; a lack of 
literature focussing on journalism in South Africa” (Retief, 2002: ix). The final report 
of the HRC highlighted the need for “an ongoing debate on the role and responsibility 
of the media in South African society” (Wasserman, 2002: 137).  
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In 2002 the South African National Editors Forum did a skills audit of journalism in 
South Africa, and what was discovered was a frighteningly low standard of general 
journalism: “One of the biggest problems facing the media industry is the 
juniorisation of the journalistic skills base. This comes at a time when the South 
African story is becoming more and more complicated. We have to get our house in 
order in a very quick way in this sense" (SANEF Final Report 2002: Cover). It is the 
contention of this study that the problem of poor journalistic standards can be 
addressed through encouraging journalists to adopt better ethical practices.   
As the country moved from a once strictly authoritarian Apartheid-legislated and 
governed media through to a democratic political dispensation, the next two decades 
saw the media playing a vital role in nation-building whilst simultaneously serving as 
a watchdog for any  wrongdoing on the part of the State, Government, and its 
officials. For example, instances of corruption, maladministration, and tender fraud 
have been particularly highlighted by South African media. The South African media 
has been incisive in exposing wrongdoing on the part of government officials, and 
big business that may have been involved.  
 
2.1. Whistleblowers as key sources of information  
It is important for us to understand the distinction between a journalist’s “source” and 
a “whistleblower”. Journalists depend to a large extent on members of the public 
(sources) for the supply of information that may be of interest to the general public. 
In most cases, these sources are quite content to be quoted in the media. But 
occasionally, citizens come forward with information of a secret or highly sensitive 
nature. They believe such information - relating for example to corruption, 
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misgovernment or the activities of organised criminals – should be made known to 
the general public, to expose wrongdoing or to stimulate public debate on the 
subject. For fear of reprisals, these sources may then wish to remain anonymous, 
and are therefore regarded as confidential sources that may not be named in the 
publication of a story.  
A whistleblower, according to the Oxford Dictionary, is “a person who informs on a 
person or organization engaged in an illicit activity”. Whistleblowers and the act of 
whistleblowing have been making headlines as well as impacting on public policy for 
centuries. This is exemplified in the following statement by Calland and Dehn: 
“whistleblowing is about basic issues which lie at the heart of human activity. It 
covers loyalty and the questioning of dubious practices. It concerns communication 
and silence. It is about practising what one preaches and about leadership. It 
focuses on responsibility towards others and the accountability of those in charge. It 
is where public and private interests meet” (2004: 200).  
Whistleblowers are useful sources for journalists. Investigative journalist Gavin 
MacFadyen, speaking about the role of whistleblowers in journalism, clarifies the 
distinction between the two: “Whistleblowing remains one of the most important 
sources of major exposes’ and the cultivation and protection of whistleblowers is a 
central preoccupation for investigative journalists. Different from “sources’ who may 
have personal or family connections to a story, whistleblowers are almost always 
employees and inside” (MacFadyen, G., in de Burgh, H. et al: 140).  
The aim of this report is to examine the extent to which journalistic ethics played a 
part in two major South African stories that involved whistleblowers: the 1991 
“Inkathagate” story and the 1989 “Vlakplaas” story. Both whistleblowers had been 
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employees: Brian Morrow was a policeman who discovered that the South African 
Police was funding a political party, the Inkatha Freedom Party; and Dirk Coetzee 
was a Security Policeman who blew the whistle on the covert activities of a 
Specialised Unit from within the South African Security Forces. Both stories had 
tremendous impact on the course of history in South Africa into the 1990s, as well as 
on the role and identity of the media in an evolving and contested landscape. I 
interviewed the key role-players in both stories: the journalists who broke the stories 
and the whistleblowers who provided the information, in an attempt to ascertain:  
1. the manner in which the journalists interacted with their sources;  
2. the socio-political context in South Africa at the time that the stories broke;  
3. the media landscape at the time, especially the role of the alternative press in 
South Africa in the late 80s and into the 90s;  
 
4. the difficulty that journalists had in verifying information at that time; 
5. the parameters of ethical journalism that were in existence at the time;  
6. whether there were any breaches of ethical conduct by the 
journalists/publications;  
 
7. the extent of protection given to the sources by the journalist;  
8. the legislative framework under which the respective journalists were 
operating at the time;  
 
9. And, whether these expose’s changed journalism in South Africa with regards 
to sources/whistleblowers. 
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3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
3.1. Main Question 
 What informs the ethical decision-making of journalists when they are presented 
with confidential information from leaked sources, such as whistleblowers?  
This question shall be answered with specific reference to the ethical issues that 
arose in the handling of confidential sources in the following two major South African 
stories: “Inkathagate” (1991) and “Vlakplaas” (1989). 
3.2. Secondary questions 
These secondary questions were posed to ascertain the background and context for 
the actions taken by the whistleblowers and the journalists involved: 
1. How did the journalists conduct themselves in their interaction with their 
sources, and what do we weigh that conduct against?  
2. Are there lessons to be learnt from these case studies, or areas neglected in 
the present day Press Code? 
3. Have these stories changed journalism in South Africa with regards to 
sources/ whistleblowers?  
4. What made these journalists more ethical in their profession or practices, vis- 
a-vis the mainstream media of the day? 
5. What is it that differentiates the notion of “public interest” as opposed to “what 
the public might be interested in”? 
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4. RATIONALE 
This study examines the ethical issues faced by the journalists concerned in the two 
case studies: the “Inkathagate” and “Vlakplaas” stories. This study outlines the 
media landscape, in terms of ownership and legislation, looks at the politics of the 
time, as well as the alternative press in South Africa in the late 1980s and into the 
1990s. It locates the “Vlakplaas” and “Inkathagate” stories within the critical role of 
information at the time, the difficulty of verifying information, as well as the role of 
spies and whistleblowers. It provides a critical analysis of normative theory in this 
context, as well as the changing role of the mainstream media at the time, as 
articulated by Tomaselli (2003): “While the changing social context resulted in a 
contestation of the normative ideals set for the post-apartheid media, the media itself 
also underwent change in a number of areas, including changes in the political 
economy of the media, the emergence of new information and communication 
technologies and the reconceptualisation of audiences” (cited in Wasserman, 2005: 
49). 
 Journalistic codes of ethics have evolved over time, and are dependent on the 
environment or context in which journalists operate. It is the contextual uniqueness 
of the two South African case studies - “Inkathagate” and “Vlakplaas” stories – that 
does help to shed light on some of the ethical issues faced by journalists in the 
1980s.  
There are many ethical issues that arise in relation to whistleblowing and journalism. 
What does a journalist do when confronted with inside information about a particular 
issue from a leaked source? And how does the journalist handle the source, as well 
as the information? In his book on journalistic ethics, Black white and Grey: Ethics in 
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South African Journalism, Franz Kruger states, “The relationship with sources is one 
of three important relationships journalists have, the others being with their 
audiences and their employers. What do we owe them in return, these people who 
trust us with their stories?” Kruger suggests three ways: “firstly, we should deal with 
them honestly.... secondly; we should show them consideration... (and avoid doing 
harm).... finally, we should maintain a professional distance” (Kruger, 2004: 174-
175). These three elements of source-handling, as described by Kruger, will be 
discussed in more detail in the theoretical framework section. 
It is in the ethical handling of whistleblowers and their information that journalists 
have to follow journalistic codes of practice. These codes of practice have been 
devised by media organisations in order to ensure that journalists abide by ethical 
behaviour in order to produce their stories. The South African Press code has 
evolved over time, and shall be discussed in more detail in the Theoretical 
Framework chapter.  
 
5: CONTEXT AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
5.1. Introduction 
Across the globe, there have been several famous stories that have stemmed from 
information leaked by whistleblowers. As Anton Harber stated in his column in 
Business Day (8 August 2003), “The scandals of Watergate, Muldergate and 
Inkathagate would never have burst into the open , bringing down presidents and 
ministers, if it wasn’t for a lonely, hidden Deep Throat” (Harber, 2003). The “Deep 
Throat” Harber refers to is the generic whistleblower responsible for some of the 
biggest stories of the past century. In the United States of America, “Deep Throat” 
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was also the name given to the whistleblower in the Watergate scandal, the 
anonymous insider “who was revealed after his death as W. Mark Felt, a senior FBI 
official. The 1970-71 Watergate scandal forced the resignation of US President 
Richard Nixon and the jailing of Nixon’s key White House staff.” The Washington 
Post reporters Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward were able to “keep the identity of 
Felt secret for 30 years. Their story became the basis of a motion picture, All the 
Presidents Men.” (MacFadyen, G., in de Burgh, H. et al, 2008: 140).  
 
5.2. WikiLeaks  
Let us look at a source-story that gripped the attention of the world: what became 
known as the WikiLeaks saga. Using classified and secret information, news leaks, 
and documents from anonymous sources, Wikileaks exposed many stories which 
became front page news. ‘WikiLeaks was founded in 2007 by Julian Assange, a 
brilliant and mercurial Australian former computer hacker. Assange believed that 
information, even classified or dangerous information, should be available to 
everyone. It was in that spirit that he had already given the Guardian, New York 
Times, and Spiegel official US frontline records from the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. In an agreement forged originally by Assange and the Guardian, the three had 
simultaneously published the so-called War Logs in July and October 2010’ 
(Lundgen, 2011: 1).  
Assange believed in the free movement of information. Whilst he registered the 
domain name WikiLeaks.org in 1999, Assange only began to use it actively in 2006, 
when he transformed the website into a safe and secure location for whistleblowers. 
Assange wanted specifically those whistleblowers that had secret documents for 
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sharing in a public or online platform like WikiLeaks. ‘Assange was the one to start a 
relationship with the Guardian. As early as 2007, recalls Editor Rusbridger, he 
received regular emails from WikiLeaks “editor-in-‐chief” Assange, sometimes with a 
good story to tell’ (Lundgen, 2011: 2). That ongoing relationship led to the publishing 
agreement between Assange and the Guardian, and later involved a host of media 
houses across the globe. The Guardian set up a special unit of investigative 
journalists to process and redact the huge amounts of information that Assange had 
made available to them.  
 
One of the significant events during this period was the arrest of US Army Private 
Bradley Manning on May 26 2010. Manning was charged with illegally downloading 
hundreds of thousands of classified US documents, on suspicion that he may have 
passed on the documents to WikiLeaks. This led to Assange’s periodic 
disappearances from the public eye and from contact with his media partners. 
Assange also reneged on the original agreement he had established with the 
Guardian. Behind their backs, he reached out to other media organisations to 
maximise the impact of the leaked documents. Assange was also arrested and 
charged with rape in Stockholm by two Swedish women, which eventually became 
‘sexual harassment’ charges. These charges were to haunt him for the next few 
years, and eventually led to Assange seeking refuge in the Ecuadorian embassy in 
London, for more than two years in order to evade extradition to Sweden. He has 
reportedly said that the main reason he sought sanctuary in the Ecuadorian embassy 
was the very real fear that he might be shipped off to face persecution the USA, 
especially after Manning’s arrest. 
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The next major big batch of WikiLeaks revelations was the publishing of the US 
State Department diplomatic cables in November 2010 in redacted format. 
Redaction is a process of editing the cables so no one would suffer death or 
retaliation.  But in September 2011, it became public knowledge that a huge archive 
of unredacted U.S. State Department cables had been available on the internet for 
months, and that a decryption key was available to those who knew how to obtain it. 
Naturally, the content of the cables was highly sensitive, and contained unguarded 
comments, praises and critiques and revelations about the diplomatic mission’s host 
country. “There were also legal worries. The cables were classified and revealed, for 
example, the damaging news that Saudi Arabia had encouraged the US to bomb 
Iran; that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal could be threatened; that the US State 
Department had asked its diplomats to spy on United Nations personnel; or that the 
government of Yemen had offered to cover for US raids on Muslim radicals in 
Yemen. Britain had an Official Secrets Act that was frequently invoked to prevent 
publication of sensitive materials. The US had an Espionage Act. Either government 
might yet intervene” (Lundgen, 2011: 2).  
Wikileaks has become one of the biggest source-stories in history. It has opened up 
a battery of ethical issues for all journalists and media houses in their interaction with 
sources, anonymous or otherwise. The Guardian and its journalists were concerned: 
were they in control of the process or were they being manipulated by Assange to 
publish the classified information, with dishonourable intentions? The ethical 
principle of truth-telling, with its need for accuracy and fairness may have also been 
compromised. There was always the possibility that more people could be harmed or 
killed as a result of the revelations, which is a distinct ethical concern. Although there 
was a consideration that publishing was in the public interest, there was also the 
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possibility of misleading the public; and that in seeking to ‘hold the powerful 
accountable’ there lay the possibility of causing harm to national security and 
damaging international diplomacy. 
 
5.3. A South African Perspective 
South Africa too has a rich vein of investigative journalism, exposing corruption, 
nefarious business practices, and excesses of power. One such example is the 1978 
“Muldergate” or “Infogate” expose’ in the Rand Daily Mail and the Sunday Express 
by Mervyn Rees, Chris Day and Kitt Katzin. The scandal toppled the country’s Prime 
Minister BJ Vorster, as well as the National Party’s candidate who was pipped to 
succeed him, Dr. Connie Mulder. In 1973 Vorster had agreed to Mulder's plan to 
move about R64-million from the defence budget for a series of propaganda 
projects. The plans included bribes of international news agencies and the purchase 
of the Washington Star newspaper. Vorster had also known about a secret slush 
fund to set up The Citizen, an English language newspaper that was favourable to 
the National Party government. As Hadland states, “The story of how a group of 
investigative reporters unravelled the complex plot involving secret military slush 
funds, cabinet ministers, and an extraordinary and costly propagandistic drive to 
improve apartheid South Africa’s global image ranks right up there in South African 
journalism’s hall of fame” (2005: 11). 
5.3.1. South Africa, 1980s and 1990s 
The 1980’s in South Africa was characterised by severe state repression and violent 
resistance from liberation movements. “By 1980 the apartheid state was 
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experiencing a severe crisis of legitimacy. Externally the wars with its neighbouring 
states were draining its resources. Internally student protests and industrial action, 
along with the ANC’s armed struggle and the rise of the black consciousness 
movement during the 1970s, posed a significant threat to state domination” (Dugard, 
2003: 23). A declining gold price, coupled with a protracted depression from the mid-
1970s, led to massive unemployment and an escalation of an economic and political 
crisis. Under State President PW Botha, the government had become militarised, 
and created a “Total Strategy” to counter what Botha called the “Total Onslaught” 
that he felt was afflicting the country. ‘Security legislation, namely the Internal 
Security Act 74 of 1982, the Public Safety Act 3 of 1953 and the Criminal Procedure 
Act 51 of 1977, was used to detain, interrogate and intimidate the state’s opponents. 
Between 1980 and 1986 approximately 43950 people were detained. In June 1984 
the Protection of Information Act 84 of 1982 was invoked to prevent the press from 
publicising certain detentions, and figures about detentions released by the police 
were always hopelessly conservative” (Dugard, 2003: 25).  
It was a period marked with formal repression by the apartheid state: ‘During this 
period the South African government made full use of its barrage of security 
legislation in order to effect a clampdown on civil disobedience. As a pre-cursor, a 
partial state of emergency was declared in July 1985 and the Congress of South 
African Students (Cosas) was banned in August of the same year. To consolidate 
the initiative, a full state of emergency was imposed in June 1986, to be renewed 
each year until June 1990’ (Dugard, 2003: 39).  
The full State of Emergency was imposed countrywide: “On 12 June 1986 – four 
days before the 10th Anniversary of the Soweto Uprising – the government declared 
a country-wide State of Emergency. The crackdown differed from the 1985 
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Emergency in that it covered the entire national space and was more rigorous:  
political funerals were restricted, curfews were imposed, certain indoor gatherings 
were banned and news crews with television cameras were banned from filming in 
areas where there was political unrest. This in essence prevented both national and 
international news coverage of police brutality and the government’s faltering 
attempts to contain the wave of social unrest. An estimated 26,000 people were 
detained between June 1986 and June 1987.” 
(http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/state-emergency-south-africa-1960-and-1980s) 
The state security apparatus was also guilty of fomenting violence in the black 
townships, across the country. The police, army and covert security units were 
colluding with parties and organisations (such as Inkatha) that were in direct 
opposition to the broad liberation movement (led by the UDF and ANC). Vigilante 
groups and hit-squads were supplied with weapons to kill supporters and officials of 
liberation groups aligned to the ANC.   
What was becoming increasingly clear is that South Africa in the late 1980s was 
embroiled in a low intensity war:  
“Low-intensity war, usually called low-intensity conflict (LIC), has a long 
history, born of colonial oppression and wars of conquest and liberation. In 
South Africa, LIC was practised by the apartheid regime in the 1980s and 
early 1990s as a tool in its struggle against mass resistance and liberation 
movements. Although it differs from context to context, LIC is characterised by 
the use of covert action and non-conventional methods of warfare that serve 
to spread fear, insecurity and internal divisions among target populations. For 
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its practitioners, LIC has the benefit of being cost effective and less 
internationally visible than conventional war’ (Dugard 2003: 1). 
The 1989 Vlakplaas story brought the international spotlight to bear on South Africa’s 
covert war to remove all voices of opposition. By July 1991, at the time of the 
“Inkathagate” story, change was in the air in South Africa. Nelson Mandela had been 
released in February 1990. There was a negotiation process under way, between the 
ANC and National Party government. But still the De Klerk government was 
attempting to influence the course of events, by strengthening the reach of Inkatha, a 
Zulu ethnic party with roots in the province of KwaZulu Natal, and ambitions of 
reaching a wider national voting base:   
‘In July 1991 the Mail & Guardian provided the first conclusive evidence of the 
De Klerk government’s support for the IFP. The expose revealed over R250 
000 of funding from the SAP for IFP rallies, in order to show everyone that 
Buthelezi has a strong base. In the aftermath of the Inkathagate debacle, the 
Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, was relieved of his post, and the 
Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, was moved to the political backwaters of 
the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs. Subsequently the Mail &Guardian 
and other newspapers exposed a wider government web of support for the 
IFP, which involved gun-running and military training.’ (Dugard 2003: 50). 
 
5.3.2. Reporting in South Africa: 1980s 
The 1980’s saw a marked rise in the “alternative press”, or alternative publications 
that were clearly set up as the voices of the oppressed majority in South Africa. As a 
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result of alternative reporting gaining traction during this period, the media in South 
Africa was operating in an extremely harsh and dangerous environment. “This simply 
meant severe restrictions on the media, successive states of emergency and giving 
the security establishment a free hand to disrupt and destroy opponents without 
worrying too much about the law. Death squads, dirty tricks, torture, bannings, 
detention without trial and disinformation campaigns became the order of the day” 
(Du Preez & Pauw, in Pilger, 2005: 195).  
The imposition of the States of Emergency from 1985 onwards placed even more 
severe restrictions on news reporting. The areas where political unrest was at its 
highest were off limits to the press. There was no freedom of the press and what the 
public had the 'right to know' was completely formulated and controlled by those in 
power. The press, particularly the alternative press, which included papers such as 
The Weekly Mail and Vrye Weekblad, were suppressed and pressurised, as were 
the more mainstream editors who dared to criticise the government. These 
alternative newspapers struggled to survive. Operating under repeated harassment, 
Vrye Weekblad lasted only a few years. There were media restrictions and bannings 
during this period: “This led to the banning of mostly alternative newspapers for 
periods ranging from one to nine months. Titles that were banned included South, 
New Nation, Weekly Mail, Grassroots and New Era” (Oosthuizen, 2002: 86).  
In order to expose the extent of state repression in the country, some South African 
“alternative” newspapers used information derived from leaked sources or 
whistleblowers from within the organs of the Apartheid state. This was due to the 
mainstream media (including the public broadcaster the SABC) largely ignoring the 
severe crisis of repression that had gripped the country. This statement is supported 
by the finding of the 1997 Truth and Reconciliation Commission inquiry, which 
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stated: “With the notable exception of certain individuals, the mainstream 
newspapers and the SABC failed to report adequately on gross human rights 
violations. In so doing, they helped sustain and prolong the existence of apartheid’ 
(TRC Report, 1998: 189). This statement is supported by the fact that when the Vrye 
Weekblad broke the story about “Vlakplaas” in 1989, the mainstream media in South 
Africa largely ignored the story. However, Dirk Coetzee’s revelations about hit 
squads and Vlakplaas received widespread coverage in newspapers across the 
globe, as well as on other alternative newspapers in South Africa.  
A watershed announcement by then State President F.W. de Klerk, on 2 February 
1990, signalled the change that was to come: 
 Political organisations such as the African National Congress (ANC) and the 
South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Pan Africanist Congress 
(PAC) were unbanned;  
 That political prisoners will be released; 
 And those media emergency regulations were abolished. 
 
De Klerk’s announcement “had far-reaching implications for the media: 
 formerly prohibited organisations were free to publish their ideas, even in their 
own media; 
 formerly prohibited persons could be quoted freely in the media; and 
 Coverage could again be given to unrest in the country.” (Oosthuizen, 2002: 
45) 
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A significant effect of this announcement was that the mainstream media began to 
cover issues and events that they had traditionally ignored, and which had previously 
been the sole preserve of the alternative media in South Africa. There was a blurring 
of the parameters, which ultimately led to the demise of the alternative press. There 
was also the issue of international funding drying up for the alternative press, which 
further hastened their demise.  
 
1.3.1. Case Study One: “Vlakplaas” 
Another major South African story was the 1989 Vlakplaas expose’ which had 
serious implications for the country’s history. This story provides an important case 
study in source-handling by journalists, as well as the importance of carrying out a 
thorough investigation on the facts presented. Corroboration of the source’s story 
was vital. The whistleblower was Captain Dirk Coetzee, who had been the 
commander in charge of the South African Police's secret elite unit, called Section 
C1. The unit was stationed at Vlakplaas, a farm outside of Pretoria.  Section C1's 
methods included assassination, kidnapping, poisoning and execution of anti-
apartheid activists. Coetzee had ordered the deaths of many ANC activists, including 
Griffiths Mxenge, a human rights lawyer, who was stabbed 40 times at Umlazi 
Stadium in Durban, and Sizwe Kondile, a young law graduate from the Eastern 
Cape, who was interrogated and beaten then handed over to Coetzee who had him 
shot and his body burned. 
But Coetzee’s career at Vlakplaas was short-lived. A series of embarrassing events, 
including a botched kidnapping in Swaziland which he was involved in, as well as 
Coetzee’s abrasive personality and disrespect for his superiors, ultimately led to his 
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discharge from the police force in 1984. An embittered Coetzee had earlier decided 
to spill the beans about Vlakplaas. He met investigative journalists Martin Welz and 
Jacques Pauw in 1985. They initially thought Coetzee’s story about his (and 
Vlakplaas’) nefarious activities were fantasies, tales spun by a rogue policeman, 
which could not be easily verified or corroborated. But his story did strike a chord 
with the journalists: 
 “‘I was in the heart of the whore,’ Coetzee said. His words later became the 
title of my first book. When I asked him what he meant, he said it was his own 
phrase to describe how deeply entrenched he had been in the inner workings 
of the security police” (Pauw, 2006: 19). 
After several interactions with the former Vlakplaas commander, Pauw and Welz 
gradually recognised that there was some credibility in Coetzee’s revelations. But it 
was a single-source story, and therefore needed to be verified by another source, or 
through investigations. The difficulty was that the journalists had no corroborating 
evidence. Four years after Pauw had first met Coetzee, the corroborating evidence 
emerged through a prisoner on death row.  
In the Weekly Mail of 20 October 1989, Almond Nofemela a policeman from the 
notorious Vlakplaas unit, revealed details about the political assassinations he was 
involved in. A week before he was due to hang for murder, Nofemela confessed to 
the murders of nine more people, who were killed on the orders of his police captain, 
Dirk Coetzee. Nofemela’s life was saved on the grounds that he knew of crimes that 
required further investigation. His lawyer gave the story to the Weekly Mail. After 
investigations by journalist Ivor Powell, Weekly Mail broke the story. The Nofemela 
story provided the corroboration that the Vrye Weekblad needed to expose 
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Coetzee’s life story. “Coetzee had mentioned Almond Nofemela as one of his death 
squad operatives, and their accounts converged in nearly all respects” (Pauw, 1991: 
162). Vrye Weekblad had arranged for Coetzee to flee the country and meet the 
ANC in exile. On the 5 November 1989, Coetzee flew out with Pauw, first to 
Mauritius, where he revealed the details of Vlakplaas in its entirety. Pauw then took 
Coetzee to London, where they met with the ANC in exile, and sought protection 
from the banned and liberation organisation.  
On the 17th November 1989, Pauw’s story about Vlakplaas broke on the front page 
of Vrye Weekblad. “That edition was one of the most beautiful things I’d ever cast my 
eyes upon. The front page showed a photograph of Dirk Coetzee and the startling 
headline: ‘Bloedspoor van die SAP’ (Bloody trail of the SAP). The sub-headline 
enticed readers to ‘Meet Captain Dirk Johannes Coetzee, commander of an SA 
Police death squad. He tells exclusively the full and gruesome story of political 
assassinations, poisoned cocktails, foreign bomb blasts and letter bombs.’”(Pauw, 
2006: 35).  
The timing of this story was crucial in South Africa’s history. It exposed the existence 
of the South African government’s hit squads that were systematically eliminating 
opponents of the apartheid regime. Up until then, many people had guessed that the 
hit squads had existed, but they had no proof of this. The story exposed the sheer 
brutality that the apartheid regime was capable of, and showed that the regime was 
intending to hold onto power at all costs: “We also exposed Eugene de Kock as the 
current head of Vlakplaas. We said he’d been there for six years, was implicated in 
many more ‘eliminations’ than Coetzee, and might be killing so-called enemies of the 
apartheid state at that very moment. We gave details of eleven people he had 
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already ‘taken out’, though it later emerged that he had actually killed more than ten 
times as many” (Pauw, 2006: 35). 
Coetzee lived in exile for three years. He returned to South Africa in 1993, and in 
May 1997 was tried and found guilty for his role in the murder of Griffiths Mxenge. 
But he had applied to the Truth Commission for amnesty and in August 1997 he was 
granted amnesty for Mxenge’s murder. At the TRC hearing in Durban, Coetzee was 
asked what he felt about what he had done to the Mxenge family. He said he felt 
“humiliation, embarrassment and the hopelessness of a pathetic, ‘I am sorry for what 
I have done’ ... What else can I offer them? A pathetic nothing, so in all honesty I 
don’t expect the Mxenge family to forgive me, because I don’t know how I ever in my 
life would be able to forgive a man like Dirk Coetzee if he’d done to me what I’ve 
done to them” (Edelstein, 2002). 
  
1.3.2. Case Study two: “Inkathagate” 
The 1991 Inkathagate expose’ was made possible by the whistleblower Brian 
Morrow. Morrow was a disillusioned security policeman working in Durban, having 
been assigned to spy on white people who did not support apartheid. When he 
discovered top secret files that proved that the police force was funding the Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP), Morrow smuggled the documents out of the office and built up 
a serious cache of incriminating documents. Morrow fled to England with the 
documents, got in touch with journalist David Beresford from the Guardian 
Newspaper, and revealed the documents to him. Beresford then called Anton 
Harber, editor of the Weekly mail, and told him about the whistleblower. The UK 
journalist faxed 10 pages of Morrow’s documents to Harber, who investigated the 
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documents with Eddie Koch. The Guardian and the Weekly Mail simultaneously 
broke the corruption scandal dubbed “Inkathagate”, on 19 July 1991.  
A significant consequence of the Inkathagate expose’ was that it ultimately led to the 
downfall of Cabinet Minister Adriaan Vlok in the apartheid government. It stemmed 
from a live television interview on the SABC current affairs programme ‘Agenda”, in 
which both Vlok and Harber appeared:  
“It is a small thing forgotten by all except me and my immediate family, I 
suspect, but I had a part to play in the downfall of cabinet minister Adriaan 
Vlok (now facing murder charges). Those around in the early 1990s might 
remember that I confronted him with evidence of Inkathagate on live television 
one Sunday night. He was demoted a few days later” (Harber, 2007). 
Arising from the Morrow revelations, Weekly Mail managed to uncover more 
incriminating evidence. The apartheid government had also funded the IFP’s United 
Workers’ Union of South Africa (UWUSA) to the tune of R1.5-million. And six months 
later, the newspaper revealed the existence of a ‘Third Force’: these were IFP hit 
squads run by the South African Defence Force (SADF) aimed at undermining the 
ANC and promoting the IFP (Weekly Mail, 24 January 1992). 
 
6. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
6.2. Normative theory  
The main theoretical framework that underpins this study is that of the normative 
theories of media, which deal with “ideas of how media ought to or are expected to 
operate” (McQuail, 1987: 109). Normative theory informs the role and purpose of the 
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journalist in society. ‘The overall purpose of normative theory is to develop a 
yardstick against which media performance, accountability and quality could be 
measured and, if needed, controlled. A second purpose of normative theory is to 
assess the freedom of media systems under specific political regimes. Fundamental 
in normative theory (as conceptualised in the West) is the right to freedom of 
expression as prerequisite for democracy and thus the role of the media in 
democracy. Central questions in normative theory include the following:  
 How and what do the media publish and circulate as matters of public 
concern? 
 How do the media cover different perspectives in a society? 
 What is perceived to be in the public’s interest, and why? 
 How is public interest defined? 
 What are the social responsibilities of the media? 
 How should the media be organised legally and financially in order to realise 
its potential as a carrier of public values?’ (Fourie, 2011: 27).  
It is the contention of this study that both the “Vlakplaas” and “Inkathagate” case 
studies are seminal moments in South African media history, and this study looks at 
how both stories fulfil the normative function of the media.  
 
6.1. Libertarian Press Theory 
Libertarian Press theory or the Free Press Theory is one of the Normative 
Theories of mass communication, and is the main theoretical framework that 
underpins this study. It was largely founded on the emphasis on democracy and 
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personal freedom that emerged from the enlightenment era (Fourie 2001:271). The 
libertarian theory emphasizes the uncensored access of knowledge to the public, 
where the media is given absolute freedom to publish anything at any time and acts 
as a watchdog. It promotes the fact that people are able to discern between truth and 
lies, between good and evil, and the press are vital in this search. Fourie states: "the 
press is seen as a source of information ... informing people about government ... 
and enabling them to monitor their government and form their own ideas about 
policy. The press should be free from government control and government influence" 
(2001:271). Oosthuizen (2002: 40-41) states that among other things this media 
theory upholds the role of the media as watchdog with respect to the government’s 
conduct. It also supports the idea that “editorial attacks on governments or political 
parties are acceptable, since the news media is expected to be the public’s 
watchdog” (Oosthuizen, 2002: 40). 
The press, in this theory, is seen as the fourth estate, which is there to keep a 
watchful eye on the government and guard the freedom of the people. It is where the 
press have been "encouraged to act as a fourth estate along with the legislative, 
executive and judicial authorities in the governing process" (Fourie 2001:271). 
The libertarian theory is just the opposite of the Authoritarian theory of mass media 
where information is controlled by the state or the authorities. In libertarian theory, 
media is supposed to be privately owned. 
Some of the strengths of the Libertarian Theory are: that media can give true 
information without any control; there is no censorship; all individuals can express 
their opinions and thoughts in the media openly; the theory encourages healthy 
competition among the thoughts and ideas; every work will be transparent to all; it 
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checks the government and the state authorities and also prevents corruption; it 
functions with democracy. 
Some of the weaknesses of the Libertarian Theory are that the media might not 
always act responsibly; that journalists might not always have good intentions and 
ethics; people cannot always make rational judgments; there could be conflicting 
notions of the concept of freedom for different types of people; that the media can 
misuse its power and harm other people’s privacy and dignity; that media might 
defame, cause sedition, libel or slander, be immodest, publish obscenity and cause 
trouble; and that the media might challenge the security of the state. 
The two case studies are located within the tradition of the “alternative Press” in 
South Africa, whose reporting was in keeping with the Libertarian concept of 
“uncensored access of knowledge to the public”.  
 
6.4. Journalistic ethics 
This study looks at the issue of Journalistic ethics, to examine the conduct of the 
journalists concerned in terms of source-handling.  According to the Oxford 
Dictionary Online, ethics are “moral principles that govern a person’s behaviour or 
the conducting of an activity”. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines ethics as: 
“rules of behaviour based on ideas about what is morally good and bad; an area of 
study that deals with ideas about what is good and bad behaviour; a branch of 
philosophy dealing with what is morally right or wrong.” The concept of ethics has its 
roots in Greek philosophy, which divided the world of knowledge into three parts: 
aesthetics, epistemology and ethics. “Ethics encompassed the study of what is good 
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for individuals and society. In this regard, the philosophers focussed on individual 
virtues such as courage and justice, and societal virtues such as freedom” 
(Oosthuizen 2002: 10-11). Ethics has to do with the society’s notions of right and 
wrong: “In every society, there are basic standards or expectations of what 
constitutes acceptable behaviour or proper conduct” (Oosthuizen, 2002: 10). Ethics 
permeates every field of human endeavour, and each industry that has evolved over 
time in the world, has a codified set of ethics that defines what is acceptable in that 
industry or not. For example, there are codes of business ethics, medical ethics and 
journalistic ethics, to name a few. “The earliest reference to a code of ethics for 
journalists appeared in the 1840s, and the first known example of press criticism that 
made explicit reference to journalistic ethics was published in 1889. The first formal 
code of ethics did not appear until 1911” (Iggers, 1999: 58).  
Hence, journalistic codes of ethics have also evolved over time, and provide useful 
tools for this study. Despite some lapses, “the history of journalism ethics reflects the 
march of moral progress: a gradually increasing awareness by journalists of their 
professional responsibilities and a parallel development of the institutional framework 
for assuring a high standard of journalistic conduct. This progress can be seen in the 
growing professionalism of the workforce (increasing autonomy) and in the 
development of formal standards of journalistic conduct (increasing accountability)” 
(Iggers, 1999: 57). 
Journalism ethics and standards comprise principles of ethics and of good practice 
as applicable to the specific challenges faced by professional journalists. This subset 
of media ethics is widely known to journalists as their professional "code of ethics" or 
the "canons of journalism”. Most of these codes share common elements, including 
the principles of truthfulness, accuracy, objectivity, impartiality, fairness, and public 
31 
 
accountability. I have used the concept of journalistic ethics to examine the 
interaction between the respective journalists and their sources of information, in the 
two stories. These principles have been tested in investigating the journalists’ 
conduct in handling their sources, in both case studies.  
Retief (2002: 44-45), put together the following brief codes of ethics from all the 
ethical codes he studied, called the “Ten Commandments for Ethical Journalism” 
(quoted in Claassen 2005; 138): 
‘Preamble: The media shall be free because the public has a right to be informed. 
You shall therefore:  
1. Be accurate, both in text and context (and correct mistakes promptly). 
2. Be truthful, only using deceptive methods in matters of public importance if 
there is no other way of uncovering the facts. 
3. Be fair, presenting all relevant facts in a balanced way. 
4. Be duly impartial, in reporting the news and when commenting on it. 
5. Protect confidential sources, unless it is of overriding public interest to do 
otherwise. 
6. Be free from obligation from any interest group. 
7. Respect the privacy of individuals, unless it is overridden by legitimate public 
interest. 
8. Not intrude into private grief and distress, unless such intrusion is overridden 
by a legitimate public interest. 
9. Refrain from any kind of stereotyping. 
10.  Be socially responsible in referring to matters of indecency, obscenity, 
violence, brutality, blasphemy and sex.’ 
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In terms of source-handling by journalists, Kruger states that ‘firstly we should deal 
with them honestly. We need to be open with them about who we are, and our 
intentions... secondly, we should show them consideration... a fundamental principle 
of journalism ethics is to avoid doing harm. The source and the subject of our report 
(and it’s as well to remember that they are often not the same) are mostly directly at 
risk of harm. There can be damage to their reputation, to their relationships, even to 
their lives. Consideration does not mean that the source’s concerns override 
everything else. But they can be taken seriously. We should think about what’s at 
stake for the source, and the kinds of risks they take. Finally, we should maintain a 
professional distance. There’s nothing wrong with “cultivating sources” - building a 
relationship of trust in order to encourage people talking to us. But we should not 
allow a closeness to develop that undermines our professional judgement. We need 
to maintain a healthy scepticism, no matter how much we like the person we are 
dealing with’ (Kruger, 2004: 174-5). This study examines these three ethical 
elements, viz. honesty, consideration and professional distance, in the two case 
studies. 
In addition, arising from Black, Steele and Barney’s handbook, “Doing ethics in 
journalism” (1995: 17), Kruger also summarises the following “guiding principles for 
the journalist:  
a. Seek truth and report it as fully as possible 
 Inform yourself continuously so you can inform, engage, and educate the 
public in clear and compelling ways on significant issues. 
 Be honest, fair, and courageous in gathering, reporting, and interpreting 
accurate information. 
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 Give voice to the voiceless. 
 Hold the powerful accountable. 
 
b. Act independently 
 Guard vigorously the essential stewardship role that a free press plays in an 
open society. 
 Seek out and disseminate competing perspectives without being unduly 
influenced by those who would use their power or position counter to the 
public interest. 
 Remain free of associations and activities that may compromise your integrity 
and damage your credibility.  
 Recognise that good ethical decisions require individual responsibility and 
collaborative efforts. 
c. Minimise harm 
 Be compassionate for those affected by your actions. 
 Treat source, subjects and colleagues as human beings deserving of respect, 
not merely as means to your journalistic ends. 
 Recognise that gathering and reporting information may cause harm or 
discomfort, but balance those negatives by choosing alternatives that 
maximise your goal of truth-telling.” (Kruger, 2007: 14) 
This study has also investigated the use of the ethical norms of ‘seeking truth’, 
‘acting independently’ and ‘minimising of harm’ in the journalists’ conduct in the two 
case studies. This study looks at the behaviour of journalists and the extent to which 
they applied ethics in reporting on these two stories.  
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6.5. The South African Press code 
The South African Press code has also been through an historically evolutionary 
process. Currently, the South African Press code has this to say regarding the 
handling of “confidential and anonymous sources:  
 The press has an obligation to protect confidential sources of information - the 
protection of sources is a basic principle in a democratic and free society. 
 The press shall avoid the use of anonymous sources unless there is no other 
way to handle a story. Care should be taken to corroborate the information. 
 The press shall not publish information that constitutes a breach of confidence 
unless a legitimate public interest dictates otherwise.” (Press Council of South 
Africa, Review, 2011: 87). 
These fundamental ethical issues in source-handling as outlined in the Press Code, 
such as the extent of protection afforded to each source in the case studies, the 
issue of corroboration of the facts in the , and role played by ‘a legitimate public 
interest’ will be interrogated in the findings section of this report. 
Various South African media groups have their own set of ethical codes. What is 
common among them is the notion of the freedom of the press, and independence 
from government. The ethical code of the South African National Editors’ Forum 
(SANEF) states that one of its objectives is to “defend media freedom through all 
available institutions” (Retief. 2002: 240). The ethical code of the (now defunct) 
South African Union of Journalists (SAUJ) states that a journalist “shall at all times 
defend the principle of freedom of the press and other media in relation to the 
collection of information and the expression of comment and criticism” (Retief. 2002: 
240). The Freedom of Expression institute (FXI) strives to “fight for and defend the 
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freedom of expression”... and to “oppose any limitations imposed on the freedoms 
aforementioned, be they at the instance of the state or civil society” ((Retief. 2002: 
241).  
By 2014, there had been vigorous debates around the function and role of the South 
African Press Code, both during and after apartheid. The history of press oppression 
and resistance to it under apartheid has been widely written about (Oosthuizen, 2001 
a: 176; Rodny-Gumede, 2011: 155). Rodny-Gumede in particular looks at ethics and 
political bias in the current South African news media: ‘There has been increased 
pressure on journalists to conform to the ideas of the government and powerful elites 
around what role the media should play. This often involves abandoning the idea of 
journalism as a public service, and instead creates pressure for the media to report 
according to the national interest (as defined by government and government 
policies)’(Rodny-Gumede, 2011: 159). Given this notion of serving the country’s 
“national interest”, and the issue of conformity in reporting, it is vital that journalists 
are fully cognisant of the ethics involved in their profession. Wasserman (2002: 137) 
underscores this point, by looking at the issue of ethical decision-making as a basic 
journalistic skill. 
It must be noted that when the Vlakplaas story broke in 1989, the country was still 
under a repressive State of Emergency, which brought in draconian Emergency 
regulations and restrictions, severely hampering journalists and their reporting. But in 
1991, at the time when the Inkathagate scandal was revealed, the State of 
Emergency had been lifted, which meant that there were fewer restrictions on 
reporting.  
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It is also important to note that sometimes journalists are also guilty of breaching 
their own prescribed ethical codes, for whatever reasons, and for these breaches 
there are repercussions. This investigation also searched for any breaches of ethical 
conduct on the part of the respective journalists in the two case studies. 
6.6. Whistleblowing legislation 
Depending on the country in which they reside, whistleblowers also enjoy some legal 
protection. For example, in the United Kingdom, “the Public Interest Disclosure Act 
1988 (PIDA) affords a modest degree of formal protection, but excludes the security 
services or the military from its remit” (MacFadyen, G., in de Burgh, H. et al: 142). 
This would mean that a whistleblower in the armed forces or the country’s security 
establishment would have no legal protection. 
South Africa’s whistle-blowing legislation was formalised in 2001. The legislation 
known as the Protected Disclosures Act no 26 of 2000 was designed to deter and 
detect wrongdoing in the workplace, acting as an early-warning mechanism to 
prevent impropriety and corruption within the public sector. Essentially the law 
harnesses a common interest between responsible individuals who raise concerns 
they may have in the workplace with organisations and managers, who are 
accountable and prepared to respond to the bona fide concerns of their employees. 
Employees now have access to toll-free whistle-blowing telephone lines, in which 
they can anonymously report on any impropriety in their workplace. But this 
legislation came about more than a decade after the two case studies I have looked 
at. 
It must be borne in mind that both case studies were broken during varying degrees 
of repressive apartheid legislation (States of Emergency that were imposed after 
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1985), and that both sources (Coetzee and Morrow) did not have any legal 
protection (whistleblower laws, or otherwise) available to them at the time.  Although 
the worst was over in terms of repressive legislation in South Africa by 1990, both 
Morrow and Coetzee still had reason to fear for their lives. Both of them could have 
been killed in South Africa, by state security agents. They were both regarded as 
traitors by the Apartheid regime and its shadowy agents. There was at least one 
attempt on Coetzee’s life, through a parcel bomb which claimed the life of lawyer 
Bheki Mlangeni. 
 
7. METHODOLOGY 
7.1. Literature Review  
A reading and analysis of the actual articles (primary sources) published on the 
Vlakplaas and Inkathagate cases in the relevant newspapers, The Weekly Mail and 
Vrye Weekblad was done, for purposes of accuracy and context. There was also 
intensive reading of several other relevant articles (press clippings) published during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s by these two respective newspapers. This was done 
to ascertain the scale of reporting by these two alternative newspapers The Weekly 
Mail and Vrye Weekblad at the time, as well as a survey of the topics covered by 
them. It was also relevant to study other press clippings of the time, articles from 
other mainstream newspapers, such as The Sunday Times, to determine the scope 
of reporting on the two cases, or lack thereof.  
There is a wealth of secondary source material including articles, opinion pieces, and 
analytical pieces. Among them is John Pilger’s book, Tell me no lies: Investigative 
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Journalism that changed the World (2005), which contains an insightful series of 
articles on investigative journalism from around the globe. For the purposes of this 
study, the most relevant chapter in Pilger’s book was the one containing the 
reflections by Max du Preez and Jacques Pauw “Exposing Apartheid’s Death 
Squads” (191-213), which details the birth and demise of the Vrye Weekblad, 
highlighting some of their investigative pieces on death squads, Vlakplaas, Section 
C1, interactions with Dirk Coetzee and other Apartheid killers, as well as some 
historical and political context to the case studies. Jacques Pauw’s books: In the 
Heart of the Whore: the story of Apartheid’s Death Squads (1991), Into the Heart of 
Darkness: The Story of Apartheid's Killers, (1997); and Dances with Devils: A 
Journalist's Search for Truth, (2007), provided vital first-hand accounts of his 
encounters with an wide array of killers and shadowy figures in South Africa and 
beyond. They also provided valuable information on the South African political and 
media landscape of the time.  
Books, articles and collections on the birth and evolution of the Weekly Mail 
newspaper, such as Shaun De Waal’s (Ed.) 25 years of the Mail and Guardian 
(2010), which shows how the newspaper reflected and reported upon a changing 
South African landscape from the 1980s onwards, provided useful historical context 
for this study. The Weekly Mail was instrumental in breaking the Inkathagate story, 
and also broke the Nofemela story which provided the verification which the Vrye 
Weekblad needed, in order to publish the Vlakplaas/Coetzee story.  
Lawrence Piper’s (Ed) book, To Serve and Protect: The Brian Morrow Story (2010), 
provides a detailed account of Brian Morrow’s journey of discovery and flight, his 
trials and tribulations, to reveal the Inkathagate story. Several other articles and 
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newspaper interviews on Brian Morrow also provided useful insights to formulate 
questions for the interview with Morrow.  
 
For the theoretical background, books and articles on Normative Media Theory, and 
Journalistic Ethics were invaluable. Franz Kruger’s Black, White and Grey: Ethics in 
South African Journalism, delivered the core ethical arguments encapsulated in this 
study. Hadland’s (Ed) Changing the Fourth Estate: Essays on South African 
Journalism delivered a wide ranging series of South African case studies in 
investigative journalism, and ethics. 
 
The changing media landscape in South Africa during the 1980s, 1990s and into a 
post 1994 democratic country precipitated much academic debate and dialogue on 
the role of the media, media theory, normative theories of media, the concept of 
public interest, media ethics, sources and their handling (Wasserman, 2002; De Beer 
and Wasserman, 2005; Fourie 2005; Oosthuizen, 2002). 
 
7.2. Interviewees 
In-depth interviews (one-on-one) were conducted with four relevant participants, in 
the context of these stories, in order to provide an understanding of what they did 
and why they did it. I chose the four interviewees because of their direct involvement 
in both case studies. Anton Harber was the Weekly Mail editor when “Inkathagate” 
broke; whistleblower Brian Morrow revealed the documents that broke “Inkathagate”. 
And whistleblower Dirk Coetzee revealed the details of “Vlakplaas” to (then Vrye 
Weekblad journalist) Jacques Pauw.  
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 7.2.1. Jacques Pauw 
Jacques Pauw was a founder member of the anti-apartheid Afrikaans newspaper 
Vrye Weekblad, where he exposed the existence of the Vlakplaas unit and other 
police death squads in the 1980s. He has won awards in South Africa, the United 
States, Africa and Europe, including the CNN African Journalist of the Year Award, 
the Award for Outstanding International Investigative Reporting, the Young African 
Leadership Award and the Nat Nakasa award for bravery and integrity in journalism. 
He has produced documentaries on wars and conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Algeria, Sudan and 
Liberia. Pauw the author of four books: three of non-fiction and one of fiction. He is a 
journalist at Media24’s investigative unit and lives in Cape Town. 
7.2.2. Dirk Coetzee  
Captain Dirk Coetzee had been the founder and Commander in charge of the South 
African Police's secret elite unit, Section C1. Coetzee set up C1 in August 1980, and 
it was stationed at Vlakplaas, a farm outside Pretoria. He was involved in several 
political assassinations. But a year later, due to a few embarrassing incidents, 
Coetzee fell from grace, and was transferred from the Security branch to a desk job 
in the police force. Intent on revenge against his former masters, Coetzee told 
several newspapers, and even Members of Parliament, about the existence of the 
Vlakplaas death squad. But nobody did anything about it. He also spoke to Jacques 
Pauw, who was a young reporter at an Afrikaans Sunday newspaper, which 
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supported the apartheid government. Pauw cultivated Coetzee as a source, and held 
onto this information for about four years. When Pauw was at the Vrye Weekblad 
with Max du Preez, they spoke to the ANC and arranged for a safe passage out of 
the country for Coetzee. The Nofemela story broke, and then Vrye Weekblad did the 
Vlakplaas story.  
 
7.2.3. Anton Harber 
Anton Harber was a co-founder and editor of The Weekly Mail, and was prosecuted 
many times under the States of Emergency in the 1980s. Harber was editor of the 
Weekly Mail when death row prisoner and former security policeman Butana Almond 
Nofemela confessed to being a member of a police death squad that was based in a 
farm called Vlakplaas. Nofemela’s lawyer alerted the Weekly Mail about this story, 
and Harber ran the story on the front page on 20 October 1989.  Nofemela’s account 
gave Jacques Pauw and Vrye Weekblad the corroboration it needed to publish the 
Dirk Coetzee “Vlakplaas” story. Harber was also instrumental in breaking the 
“Inkathagate” story in 1991.  
 
7.2.4. Brian Morrow 
Brian Morrow was a Security Branch police officer in Durban. His role was to spy on 
white people who didn’t support apartheid. Morrow discovered some files at the 
police station that proved the South African police force was funding the Zulu political 
party Inkatha (IFP), to fuel black-on black violence. In 1991, Morrow fled to the 
United Kingdom as a political exile, with his wife. He took with him 60 pages of stolen 
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documents, and then got in touch with journalist David Beresford of the UK’s The 
Guardian newspaper. Beresford faxed 10 pages of Morrow’s stolen documents to 
Anton Harber who investigated the documents with journalist Eddie Koch. The two 
newspapers broke the corruption scandal dubbed “Inkathagate”, on 19th July 1991, 
revealing that the South African police was funding the IFP through a bank account 
(Weekly Mail, 19 July 1991).  
Brian Morrow was not granted amnesty for his role in this expose’, because he had 
breached the Officials Secrets Act. He says he cannot return to South Africa 
because he fears for his life, as he believes that remnants from the old security 
Branch may take his life. Morrow lives with his family in Brisbane, Australia. I had 
great difficulty establishing contact with Morrow, in order to interview him for this 
research. I eventually tracked him down using social network sites such as LinkedIn 
and Facebook, on the internet. I sent him a batch of questions via email, and then 
did a telephonic interview with him using Skype.  
 
8. FINDINGS & CONCLUSION 
8.1. Introduction   
Both the “Vlakplaas” and “Inkathagate” cases presented the journalists with ethical 
and practical challenges. The central issue in this study is: what are the ethical 
issues faced by journalists, when presented with confidential information from leaked 
sources, such as whistleblowers? More specifically, how did the journalists conduct 
themselves in their interaction with the sources? Did they do so according to ethical 
guidelines and to what extent were their actions framed by the normative Libertarian 
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theory of the media? How critical was the public’s “right to know” or “public interest” 
in these two stories? Of importance too, is what motivated these whistleblowers to 
leak the information?  
From an ethical perspective, we would have to ask whether the journalists’ actions 
were in line with the general principles of journalistic ethics: truthfulness, accuracy, 
objectivity, impartiality, fairness, and public accountability. In terms of source-
handling, we shall test the journalists’ conduct against the principles of honesty, 
consideration, and professional distance as stipulated by Kruger (2004:174-5). We 
shall test whether there were any ethical lapses in the interaction.  
These questions shall be looked at in greater detail in this section. The interviews 
have shed some light on the conduct of the journalists with their sources.  
 
8.2. Interviews 
Interviews were conducted with each of the four main protagonists in the two stories: 
the two journalists (Harber and Pauw) as well as their two respective sources (Brian 
Morrow, and Dirk Coetzee).    
 
 8.2.1. Dirk Coetzee 
Coetzee was a diabetic with advanced renal failure, and was quite an embittered 
soul when we met in June 2012, at a coffee shop in Pretoria. The coffee shop was 
busy and a noisy place in which to conduct an audio-recorded interview, so I 
suggested to Coetzee that we go to my car and find a quiet spot in the parking area. 
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I began by asking Coetzee about the journalists whom he had interacted with, and 
how he had come to meet Jacques Pauw:- 
Coetzee:  “Martin Welz was the first journalist I met, a senior journalist. Jacques 
Pauw was his kind of understudy. Martin is a knowledgeable, well 
respected journalist now with Noseweek. Martin approached me on some 
corruption story regarding the National Party government. A story about 
Fanie Botha, the then Minister of Home Affairs... And then I mentioned to 
Martin about Vlakplaas and all. My career with the police force was over 
by then. I had a long fight with the corrupt security police authorities... 
corrupt as you can be... General Johan Coetzee and Basie Smit... all of 
them...in the security setup.... January 1984 was my discharge date. 
Medical grounds...Sugar diabetes for 33 years as I sit here... Insulin 
dependent.” 
Coetzee then spoke about the Afrikaner “Broederbond” or Brotherhood, a powerful 
secret society that permeated all levels of the South African apartheid government 
and its security establishment, and ruled with an iron fist: 
Coetzee:  “At that time, I could see that in order to make progress in the police, it 
wasn’t about the quality of your work but about being part of the 
‘Brotherhood’. That is how you progress in the force beyond a certain 
rank. I moved from Constable to Lieutenant in 5 years...and which was 
exceptional at the time... without a degree, etc.” 
Having been dismissed from duty in 1984, Coetzee said that he began to approach a 
few journalists in order to expose the death squads and the existence of the 
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Vlakplaas killing machine. Coetzee revealed that he had quite a struggle to convince 
reporters to take his revelations about Vlakplaas seriously. 
Coetzee:  “When I started to talk to journalists about Vlakplaas and the goings on 
there, everyone thought I was a ‘bullshitter’.  The only way I could expose 
the truth, was through the newspapers... and what a struggle it was... I 
went to the journalists to expose these stories (about Vlakplaas).... they 
did not come to me.” 
Mahendra (MR):  “What was your impression of Jacques Pauw?” 
Coetzee: “Jacques is a ‘cloak and dagger’ (type), he likes to for example, say if 
someone stabbed a guy, then it’s not a stab wound, but ‘the knife was 
turned in him’, you know always add his own style into it... he likes blood 
and guts... and so on...” 
I turned Coetzee’s attention to the interaction between himself and Pauw. 
MR: “Where did the meetings between you and Pauw take place? What 
venues did you use?” 
Coetzee: “We met... later on ...Max du Preez and Jacques Pauw, and Andre’ 
Zaaiman who worked for IDASA...we met among other places, on Van Zyl 
Slabbert’s smallholding near Kyalami racetrack. Van Zyl Slabbert was 
overseas at the time, studying. Martin (Welz) was not a drinker, at all, so 
we never met at a pub. He was respectable and respected. Not like 
Jacques, who just wanted a story. Jacques loved his liquor, just like me. 
So we met at pubs, etc. They all think that if they make you drunk, you’ll 
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spill the beans more easily. Jacques was fond of buying a lunch and so 
on.” 
MR:  “So how did you end up leaving the country in 1989, 5th November, 
Guy Fawkes Day...?” 
Coetzee: “Jacques wanted to do the interview in the country. I said to him, ‘You 
must be joking, my mate. You just want a story and then after that, where 
do I end up? As a dead man? No ways, let’s do it out of the country.’” 
Due to the concern for the safety of the source, Pauw and Du Preez then had to 
seek alternative plans, and find a way to get Coetzee out of the country. 
Coetzee: “Jacques had contact with Andre Zaaiman, a war resister, who worked for 
Idasa. Zaaiman then flew the documents (short notes) in the Dutch 
diplomatic bag to Botswana, up to Zambia, where he picked it up (he left 
the country with no documents on him), and had meetings with Jacob 
Zuma there. Zuma didn’t want to accept at that time that they will listen to 
my story, and said then that they will think about it.”  
MR:  “Were you discouraged by this? That maybe the ANC will reject your 
revelations and still take revenge against you?”  
Coetzee:  “I said ‘No ways...You’re going to help me... that will be the condition. I 
cannot come back, you know how the security set up is ... it will 
leak...whether it’s from the ANC side or the South African side...and I will 
be a target’. I said ‘just get me to settle somewhere, where I can start my 
life, in a country that won’t extradite me to SA’, and everyone said the only 
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place is England. So I said ‘Let’s do it... to nail the security police you 
have to do something extraordinary.”’ 
I turned to the question of intent: what was Coetzee hoping to get out of the 
revelations? It may have been possible that Coetzee chose to be a whistleblower in 
order to seek revenge against the South African security police. Also, far from having 
good intentions in such exposing wrongdoings, Coetzee may have been more 
interested in self-preservation, because the security establishment had been keeping 
him under surveillance.  
MR:  “Was that your intention? Were you wishing to ‘nail the security 
police’ or secure your future by going to the ANC, or both?” 
Coetzee:  “They (the South African security police) never expected me to leave the 
country, go to the ANC, sort of apologise for what I did and get my back 
up against the wall, where I’m not chased around the world by the ANC 
and the SA security police and the Ulster loyalists’ connections which they 
did in the end. Billy Wright was the Ulsterman who had to ‘take me out’ 
which means he was contracted to kill me. Billy Wright had close contacts 
with Eugene de Kock in SA. Because I knew how they operated, I stayed 
3 months in one place and then moved...you can always detect foreign 
dangers, and I reacted, and moved... because I had my two kids with 
me...” 
An important ethical consideration is how much it cost Pauw and the Vrye Weekblad 
to get Coetzee out of South Africa.  
MR:  “How did Jacques fly you out, and who paid for it?” 
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Coetzee: “The ANC paid for the whole operation, I think R50 000 at that time... 
Zuma and them paid. Jacques paid fuck all...he just rose to fame...sitting 
on his fuckin’ backside...doing fuck all every six seconds... just wants the 
story... spill the beans... and add some gruesome action...” 
It was important to ask Coetzee about his state of mind at the time; about what type 
of reception he might have imagined he would receive at the hands of the ANC in 
exile.  
MR:  “How did you feel, sitting on that plane...going to meet the ANC in 
exile...what was your level of anxiety?”  
Coetzee: “I was extremely wrecked... because I didn’t know what I was going to 
meet on the other side... My toenails removed? Hanging from my feet? 
Torture? What? I don’t know...but you’ve got to be unorthodox... 
completely unorthodox...because these arseholes in the police never 
thought I’d do THAT...!  
 So I flew out on the 5th, and then we had to stop in Durban to pick up 
more passengers, Yessus! My blood was pumping! On our way to 
Mauritius!! And when we took off from Durban, Jacques and I opened the 
champagne..! We landed in Mauritius, stayed for 5 or 6 days, where I 
spent talking to Jacques on tape, giving him all the stories, doing the 
interview, etc.”  
I then asked Coetzee about that “moment of no return”, when he arrived in London, 
and met with the ANC in exile.  
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Coetzee:  “‘Then I flew via Bahrain to London, Andre Zaaiman fetched me from 
Heathrow, and then he took me to a hotel in London. Zuma then arrived 
that morning at 10. I was knackered; my blood sugar was buggered... 
Jacob Zuma and JJ Njele, a guy that spoke fluent Afrikaans...and Zuma 
was just listening... assessing and so on... they also had their spies in 
Vlakplaas, etc. And you don’t play games when you have your back 
against the wall....you never underestimate the opposition’s knowledge... 
they brought over Billy Masethla... Zuma’s a listener...a gentleman. 
Zuma came back a second day, and said to me Andre was waiting for me 
in the foyer... I went down, and Andre said “Pack up let’s go... they believe 
your story...you’re talking the truth”. They moved me to another hotel, and 
then flew me out on the 13th of November to Harare in Zimbabwe, where I 
met more ANC chaps, and then taken to Bulawayo... when the news 
broke on 16th November 89, I was in Bulawayo...taken up by Joyce 
Rankin...I was there until 2 Feb...Zuma came over and I made a meal, etc. 
We flew onto Harare.” 
MR:  “Was there anything that you told Jacques (or anyone else) after 
that, which could have saved someone’s life? What about the 
lawyer... Bheki Mlangeni, who received a parcel...?” 
Coetzee:  “Oh yes, Bheki Mlangeni, in JHB... Eugene de Kock tried to ‘take me out’ 
(meaning kill me) and then sent me a carefully wrapped parcel, in thick 
brown paper (the type that you wrap Russian grenades in)....everything 
typed on it...stickers and so on... when Ntu, an ANC guy said to me 
‘there’s a parcel for you at the post office’ ...I said ‘No parcel comes to me 
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from the post office, for fuck’s sake!!’ So I did not take the parcel... it had 
to go Return to Sender, which was Bheki Mlangeni.... I told the ANC guys, 
Daniel Oliphant and Stanley Brown...to warn Bheki...  
 They did not listen to me... 
 I told Jacques to warn Bheki, when he flew up for the Louis van Neethling 
trial when I testified in front of a commission in London, but he did not 
warn Bheki... I said ‘I told Stanley Brown, I told Daniel Oliphant, and they 
did not listen...Bheki is going to die... it must be some bomb...! It was 
mailed on 10 May 1990 from Joubert Park Post office.’ No-one believed 
me... the parcel went back... and 3 months after that...Bheki opened that 
parcel. It was a walkman, and he put the headphones on, and walked to 
his room, switched it on, and it blew up. Bheki’s death is now seen as a 
death in the struggle... but that’s ridiculous... it could have been 
avoided...!” 
MR:  “So how did you come back to South Africa?  
Coetzee:  “Around June 1993, I tried to convince the ANC that the dust has settled, 
and it was time to go back to SA... they said ‘NO! It’s too dangerous!’ So I 
bought a one-way ticket from Alitalia...and flew back on 4 July 1993.” 
MR:  “Did you meet Jacques Pauw and Max du Preez?”  
Coetzee:  “Yes, I met Max at the Vrye Weekblad’s closing party, but it was clear that 
he had finished with me, and was not interested.” 
MR:  “How would you describe your relationship with Jacques Pauw?” 
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Coetzee:  “There’s no relationship. He’s just a guy hunting a story, for his own 
interest. He just feathers his own nest... furthers his own interest... an 
orthodox planner for his own interest.” 
8.2.2. Jacques Pauw 
The interview with Jacques Pauw was done telephonically. I began by asking him 
about what triggered the publishing of the Coetzee story. 
Pauw:  “Well....we started Vrye Weekblad in October 1988, and the first few 
months were absolute madness, because we had no money and it was 
really a battle and Max was charged time and time again under security 
legislation… then on the 1st of May 1989, David Webster was 
assassinated…and after that...I went to Max and said to him we have to 
go and speak to Coetzee again and see what we could do. Then I went 
back to Coetzee and started speaking to him on the 1st of May 
1989……Then Anton Lubowski, SWAPO leader was assassinated on 12th 
September 1989. So we started plotting a way to publish the Coetzee 
story.” 
Given the fact that there was State of Emergency imposed at the time on the 
country, and which impacted on news reporting, I asked Pauw about some of the 
hurdles he encountered in getting the story published.  
Pauw:  “The problem was ‘how do we get Coetzee to agree to us publishing the 
story?’... That was number one. Number two… ‘How do we safeguard 
him?’ Number three, ‘how do we publish the story within the State of 
Emergency?’ We thought at the time that both Webster and Lubowski 
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were killed by Vlakplaas, but it was only later, that we discovered that it 
was carried out by the CCB… these two killings triggered the need to 
publish Coetzee’s story…” 
MR:  “What were you going through at the time..? What was your level of 
anxiety? Weren’t you scared?” 
JP:  “It was scary… I don’t think I slept at all at times…there were times when 
minibuses with what we supposed were Askaris, parked in front of our 
houses…and Max and I would phone each other through the night…just 
to check on each other’s safety.... and also to keep our sanity....” 
MR:  “Did you feel morally and ethically justified to tell the Dirk Coetzee 
story, and publish it in a newspaper”  
JP:  “According to the rules of the State of Emergency, we couldn’t even 
publish the story… because at the time we couldn’t publish any story that 
jeopardised state security, without presenting it to the state for 
approval…remember how they censored the Weekly Mail at the time…the 
newspaper had black strips all over the story…with scratched out 
articles…it was completely abnormal society…and you know we were 
young and we were cowboys, and it was an alternative newspaper and 
ethically and morally we had absolutely no qualms about the story… 
There were a lot of ethical and moral dilemmas that one wouldn’t even 
think about in a normal society… but we were living under a state of 
emergency…” 
An important question was whether Pauw believed in Coetzee’s revelations. 
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MR:  “Do you honestly believe that Coetzee told you the truth? Did you 
ever have any doubts?” 
JP:  “If you look back today at what Coetzee had said to me in 1989…every 
single thing he said was the truth…there wasn’t a single thing that he lied 
about.” 
Coetzee had been discharged in 1984, and had begun talking to journalists 
(including Pauw) about Vlakplaas not long thereafter. So it was pertinent then to ask 
Pauw, why it took him a few years to actually publish the story.   
MR:  “Coetzee had been talking to you for a number of years, making his 
revelations about hit squads... yet you delayed publishing the story... 
why was that? Was it because it was essentially a single source 
story...?’ 
JP:  “Single source story? …No, we would have published Coetzee’s 
allegations, and we went and did lots of work on it… but it was the 
revelations of Almond Nofemela on death row on 20 Oct 1989, through 
the Lawyers for Human Rights, which gave the story confirmation. 
Coetzee and I had left the country a few days later. And that was a 
confirmation, (because) Nofemela was another source. Coetzee had told 
us about four operatives who had killed Griffiths Mxenge… when I came 
back from Mauritius, I looked up a guy called David Spyker Chikalanga, 
and he confirmed it as well…so by the time we published in November 
1989, we had Coetzee, Chikalanga and Nofemela.” 
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MR:  “What would you say was the broader implications for the Coetzee 
story, what were the consequences for the country?” 
JP:  “Well the wider effect of the story…was that it forced the National Party 
government to rein in their security forces, and to get down to the 
negotiating table.” 
Looking at the interaction between Pauw and Coetzee, the question then arose as to 
whether there was any relationship between the journalist and his source. 
MR:  “Do you count Coetzee as a friend?” 
JP:  “No…No… we were sort of like drawn together because of 
circumstances… I’ve lived with him in Zambia, and England and 
Zimbabwe, where I spent lots of time with him… we spent lots of time 
together. The last time I saw him was probably 1996…I haven’t seen him 
since. You know…I was also friendly with people like Ferdi Barnard for 
instance… he confessed to the murder of David Webster to me, and I 
testified against him... you know, I was even friendly towards Eugene de 
Kock  in the end.. I used to visit him in Pretoria Central prison and I used 
to take him Nando’s Chicken and whatever… you know, that’s journalism, 
isn’t it? Sometimes we get into bed with very strange people...” 
An interesting issue is that of hindsight, which often surfaces in a journalist’s life. 
Years after having published a story that had such repercussions for the country’s 
history, a journalist such as Pauw may have been dogged by questions of having 
“done things differently”.  
MR:  “What would you have done differently today?”  
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JP:  “I was very young and very inexperienced. If I had known that the state 
was going to launch such a discreditation campaign against Coetzee, I 
would have armed him with a tape recorder and I would have sent him 
back to go and speak to his former comrades and get them on tape… you 
know…” 
 
 
8.2.3. Brian Morrow 
The interview with Brian Morrow, the anonymous whistleblower in the “Inkathagate” 
expose’, was conducted via Skype. Morrow was, and still is, located in Brisbane, 
Australia.  
I began by asking Morrow about his upbringing. 
MR:  “Could you describe what your life was like, growing up in Durban, 
in Apartheid South Africa, as part of the privileged ruling class?” 
Morrow:  “Growing up was awesome. I had great parents in a great area. Won’t 
bore you with too much detail but we pretty much lived the upper middle 
class dream. Parents worked extremely hard building up their business. I 
had two ‘servants’ during this time and remain friends with both of them: 
Idah and Andrena. I also played a lot of soccer with the ‘garden boys’ in 
the local park. Probably set the tone for my non-racial view of things. I 
also went overseas every year with my dad from the age of 11/12 and 
spent a month in the UK. Exposure to ‘normal’ life, TV, news etc, probably 
also set the wheels in motion politically.” 
56 
 
MR:  “What made you join the Police force? You have said in other 
articles, that it was to avoid conscription into the army. But the army 
stint would have been two years only, whereas the police force was 
a (lifetime) career. What do you say?” 
BM:  “I know this aspect always comes across as strange but I was never going 
to go to the army. Just wasn’t an option. I felt that I could serve in the 
Police as a ‘force for good’ and see how it turned out but I could never 
serve in the army as an agent of apartheid. Things obviously never turned 
out as planned.” 
I then posed the question about the state of the nation at the time when he joined the 
police force.  
MR:  “You joined the police force in 1986. There were then a series of 
States of Emergency declared, and state repression was at its 
height. How would you describe what was going on in the country at 
that time? What was your take on the state of the nation?”  
BM:  “Tough question - I can say for sure that no-one in the police felt that we 
would have a black president by 1994! It was pretty hectic but up until 
1990 there was no hint within the force that the government was going to 
‘lose’. This changed in 1990 when the white members of the branch were 
informed that things couldn’t carry on as they were and we needed to get 
used to the idea that changes would be made. Emphasis was given to the 
global isolation we were experiencing and the impact of economic 
sanctions. Not a happy bunch I can tell you. Prior to that though the line 
was that the ‘enemy’ could be defeated and a total onslaught mentality 
57 
 
was in place. Coming into it all in 1987 was an eye opener for me! 
Torture, corruption etc.  Not the happiest times in my life.”  
MR:  “The Durban Security Branch rounded up several political activists 
in that region, and systematically tortured them, to gather 
information and to break their spirits. You speak of hearing 
frightening screams at the station. Were you involved in any of this? 
What were your observations then, about this?” 
BM:  “I can honestly say I was never involved in torture of anyone. Simply 
couldn’t do it. Again a very tough time and if I had stayed with the same 
section I would certainly have left the country/ done something about it. As 
it was I was only there for a while and ‘knew’ what was going on. I went 
through a number of scenarios to ‘expose’ the practice but came up with 
very little. Much of the torture involved tactics that didn’t leave physical 
evidence such as the ‘tubing’ and the ‘helicopter’. Police procedure said I 
should report it to my superior but he was the one overseeing the whole 
unit (Major Louwrens - whom the ANC later said was a ‘good guy’... yeah 
right!) In addition Brigadier Steyn (in charge of the SB while I was there 
from 87 -91) used to have regular contact with Louwrens about the 
‘torture’ and techniques used. I used to hear the screams at the base they 
used in the Point Road area but I made sure that I kept my visits few and 
far between. I was transferred to white organisations on my return from 
the UK (honeymoon) and they/we didn’t practice ‘physical’ torture for the 4 
years I was there.” 
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MR:  “And then you stumbled upon these documents in the office... how 
did you know which to choose? What was going through your mind 
when you picked up the first one?”’  
BM:  “I had been looking for a while and found a few interesting titbits but I just 
‘stumbled’ upon the Inkatha connection whilst doing some ‘searching’. I 
knew straight away it was gold and made it my prime focus. Everyone 
knew of the allegations of course but the government used to have fun 
‘baiting’ people saying, ‘Show us evidence. We are impartial.’ Well now I 
could prove they were not and the collusion went further than anyone 
could imagine. Now I had to make sure I could gather as much dirt as 
possible before exposing their scheme. I still believe that it is overlooked 
by the media/ history that De Klerk had no intention of giving up power. 
His plan was to cobble together a coalition against the ANC in an attempt 
to control a one man one vote scenario.” 
MR:  “So you smuggled them out of the police station...stuffed into your 
boots... you could have been caught... how scared were you, 
knowing what they (the authorities) would do to you?” 
BM:  “It’s not as open and shut as one would think. You are pretty stupid when 
you are young and I probably didn’t think everything through as clearly as 
I should have. Also the machismo of the time and the ‘role’ I was playing 
probably also played a part. I knew the consequences would be fatal but 
tried to focus on the positive. Not sure I was the best spy ever but they 
didn’t catch me so I suppose I wasn’t too bad. There were a couple of 
close calls. I was aware, but fairly careful.” 
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MR:  “Where did you hide the documents? Did you take them to your 
home? Did you have a secret hideout?” 
BM:  “At home down the bottom of the garden in a container. I would smuggle 
them out in my boots as early as possible in the day and then head off 
home. We had few rules and procedures to follow so it was a fairly simple 
process.” 
MR:  “And when did you go through (peruse) the stolen documents to 
determine how incriminating they could be?”   
BM:  “At the office. I only took documents I knew were good. There was not a 
Wikileaks aspect to this. Once in a while I would take something 
connected to another illegal activity but my focus was Inkatha and 
UWUSA (The Trade Union arm). There were whole cabinets of 
documents that I presume were all shredded when the government 
changed but I only focused on what I considered to be the biggest issue.” 
MR:  “Your colleagues then became suspicious of you. The station 
commanders discovered that some documents were missing, and 
searches were carried out at the building exits. Mysterious notes, 
purporting to be from ANC supporters, were posted on your car 
windscreen. What was your level of anxiety then?”  
BM:  “It was very high. I was living in Umbilo, Durban. I found a threatening 
letter in my letterbox. I was pretty scared, especially for my wife’s safety. I 
stayed at my parents-in law’s house. I handed the letter to my boss at HQ, 
to see if there was any reaction I could get from him.”  
60 
 
I then asked Morrow about what prompted him to leave the country in 1990, and leak 
the documents overseas:  
MR:   “So in 1990, you reached a turning point... what triggered this 
move?” 
BM:   “The fact that I was always looking over my shoulder. The note was a 
trigger point. And De Klerk was in power, saying the police was 
impartial....I said ‘You’re not impartial, I’m going to bugger you up.’” 
It was also important to find out why Morrow did not find a home in the anti-apartheid 
structures in South Africa or even overseas. 
MR:  “Why did you not think of joining the underground resistance 
movement yourself? Even when you went to the UK? The ANC was 
there too.” 
BM:  “I felt that since I had been in the police force, I knew how penetrated they 
(the ANC) were. I knew that I might be compromised. After all I had been 
stealing documents from 1988, about 4 years. I was afraid for my own 
safety.”  
MR:  “So you went to London with the documents in your suitcase, and 
phoned the journalist David Beresford, of the Guardian. Can you 
describe what happened then...? What was your interaction with 
Beresford like?”  
BM:  “Well I contacted a few people. The Times (London) weren’t interested. It 
took ages before I met Beresford. Twice. In Soho. Red T shirt. A bit 
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‘untrusting’. I used a pseudonym ‘Andy’. Beresford then spoke to Anton 
Harber of the Weekly Mail in South Africa.” 
MR:  “You gave Beresford the documents, and made him agree to the 
condition that he never asked you for your identity. Why did he trust 
you enough to believe in you, an anonymous source and 
whistleblower?”  
BM:  “We met face to face. And he didn’t believe me straight away. The 
documents were in Afrikaans. There was a leap of faith. ‘Top Secret’ was 
stamped on the cover of documents.” 
 
A key question arose, as to whether Morrow received payment from the newspapers 
for the documents. 
MR:  “Did he offer you any money? Did he seek to protect you in any 
way?” 
BM:  “I never asked for any money, and he never offered.”  
 
And the question arose as to how the documents and the story could be verified, 
either through another source, or through further investigations by the journalists. 
MR:  “The documents, some marked “Top Secret”, proved that the South 
African Inkatha political party (and a Trade Union linked to it) was 
being funded by the police through secret bank accounts. Who made 
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the link (by uncovering the name of the bank accounts), was it 
Beresford or his South African colleagues? How was this done?”  
BM:  “I gave them a cheque that I had found.  And they followed up. I presume 
it was Anton and his colleagues in South Africa who did more digging.” 
 
The UK’s Guardian and the Weekly Mail in South Africa broke the Inkathagate story 
simultaneously, on 19 July 1991.I asked Morrow about how he felt at that moment: 
MR:  “How did you feel as you read the story? What was going through 
your mind at that time?” 
BM:  “My wife never quite believed me, in the sense of how massive it was. All 
the banner headlines, everywhere we went in London. I felt pretty good. I 
didn’t have much time to relish or enjoy the moment.” 
 
But due to his Inkathagate revelations, Morrow faced prosecution in South Africa, for 
having breached the Official Secrets Act. This prevented him from returning to South 
Africa permanently.  
MR:  “Trapped in exile, you tried several times to get indemnity from 
prosecution in South Africa, because of the breach of the Official 
Secrets Act. What was this process like?”  
BM:  “It was very frustrating... I tried very hard... if you look at the facts... after 
1994... I tried a lot to get indemnity from prosecution... but the ANC just 
gave me a cold shoulder.” 
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Eventually, in 1995, Morrow went back to David Beresford to reveal his identity to 
him and the world.  
Mr:   “Were you trying to bring pressure on the South Africans to give you 
indemnity? And what was the outcome?” 
BM:  “Beresford did try to apply some sort of pressure himself... but the process 
was extremely clogged, and it led us nowhere.” 
Interestingly, Morrow also worked with the British security services MI5 and MI6.  
MR:  “What was that experience like?” 
BM:  “It was very interesting...they were very professional... my role was to 
provide information as to the true state of affairs in South Africa...The 
British government was shocked about Inkathagate...I helped them find 
people to recruit to MI6. They set up fake rugby tours to meet people...” 
There is also the issue of what being a whistleblower has cost Brian Morrow. There 
was a price he had to pay for being a whistleblower.  
MR:  “Being a whistleblower cost you a lot, didn’t it? Can you tell us what 
that price was? There was a lot that you lost...in personal terms...” 
BM:  “Yes I lost a lot... my kids grew up without seeing their grandparents... or 
any of my family... and there were also tremendous other sacrifices. I’m 
kept sane by people like Anton Harber, who said that I was the only guy 
who did something out of my conscience.” 
MR:  “What are the South African authorities saying about your status 
now?”  
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BM: “I haven’t been in touch with them recently.” 
MR:  “Do you have any regrets? Is there any bitterness that you may 
harbour towards South African authorities today? Do you still yearn 
to return?” 
BM:  “No regrets. Bitterness...? Maybe a little...yes... because there weren’t 
many whites like me... with a conscience...everyone at the Durban 
Security Branch was the opposite... And I wouldn’t want to return... I 
totally fear for my life...anyone could kill us”’ 
 
Morrow did have a parting shot for those who do not wish to acknowledge the part 
that he played in highlighting the gaps in the political negotiating process post 1990, 
in South Africa.  
BM:   “I just feel that my contribution has been underestimated by the South 
African authorities...It may have been the actions of just one person 
(me)....but I did what I felt I needed to do. I mean there were some 
policemen who killed up to 17 people in custody... and they got away 
lightly at the TRC.”   
 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
8.2.4. Anton Harber 
The interview with Professor Anton Harber was conducted as a one-on-one, in his 
office.  I began by asking him about the historical context that led to the publishing of 
the Inkathagate expose’. 
MR:  “Prof Harber, as editor of the Weekly Mail, in the 1980s and 1990s, 
you were instrumental in several newspaper expose’s that were an 
embarrassment to the Apartheid South African government. How 
would you describe what was going on in the country at that time of 
the Inkathagate expose’ in 1991? What was your take on the state of 
the nation?”  
AH:  “It was early in the political negotiations process. The ANC was back in 
the country, and it was a critical time for people to jostle for 
position...between the ANC and the IFP.  And the story had a fundamental 
effect on the way in which the IFP was seen and positioned.” 
Harber also pointed to the shrinking of the gap between the Mainstream newspapers 
and the so-called Alternative Press post-1990.  
AH:  “The gap between the alternative and the mainstream newspapers had 
closed down in a way that one didn’t notice until it happened. So there 
were areas before 1990 that only the Alternative press covered, and after 
1990, the Mainstream press began to move into those areas too. What 
had differentiated the Alternative media was eroded, and at the same time 
a lot of the funding for the Alternative media was falling away. This meant 
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that papers like Weekly Mail had a growing crisis of identity, such as how 
to manage financially.”  
MR:  “Tell us about the link between the Guardian and the Weekly Mail at 
that time...”  
AH:  “It was an informal link at the time, mainly through David Beresford.” 
MR:  “The Inkathagate scandal came to you through the efforts of 
whistleblower Brian Morrow and journalist David Beresford. How did 
that happen?” 
AH:  “From our point of view, David called us from London... and said “We’ve 
got this source and these documents. Have a look at them and we could 
do something together on this”. I never met Brian until long afterward. I 
had a sketch of who it was, but from my point of view, it was about trusting 
David. And David couldn’t tell me completely who it was, because we 
were talking long distance. So for me it was about trusting David and we 
had worked many times together, and so that wasn’t too difficult. I was 
happy to trust him. And we did our own check of the source.”  
Harber also related how incriminating the faxed documents were: 
AH:  “the moment when we saw the documents, it was clear that this was very 
serious stuff: the transfer of police money to IFP, the rallies, to support 
IFP growth and membership. There was an account, name and number... 
it wasn’t IFP, but we did check that the account existed. We did the 
verification.” 
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MR:  “The UK’s Guardian and the Weekly Mail in SA broke the Inkathagate 
story simultaneously, on 19 July 1991. How did you feel as you 
looked at the article in print? What was going through your mind at 
that time?” 
AH:  “I was extremely nervous. We were terrified that we were being set up in 
some way.” 
MR:  “Once the story broke, were there any repercussions for you and the 
Weekly Mail? How did the South African authorities react? Court 
action... Death threats or other intimidation?” 
AH:  “No, their reaction very quickly showed the documents were genuine. At 
no stage did they deny the authenticity of the documents. And the state 
couldn’t take action against the paper. It really was a free for all, and we 
were aware that if we got it wrong it would destroy our credibility and that 
if we got it right it was a huge story.” 
One of the significant repercussions of the Inkathagate story was the demise of 
Cabinet Minister Adriaan Vlok. Harber confronted him about the Inkathagate 
revelations one night on a live television current affairs programme on SABC TV.     
AH:  “Well that’s an interesting part about the way it played out. It was a time 
when the SABC was trying to show that it was changing. They were 
making me up to go on air, and after the intervention from the police, they 
bounced me off. That story ran in the Saturday Star. So then they invited 
me back on Sunday, and we now had the trump card. We were able to 
play the event so that it escalated the story, and cornered Vlok. The big 
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factor was that the SABC window was briefly opened, and I had a one-on- 
one with the Minister.” 
Our interview turned to the interaction between the source or whistleblower (Morrow) 
and the journalists (Harber and Beresford).   
MR:  “Let’s go back to Brian Morrow. Until the time that Morrow actually 
publicly revealed his identity in 1994-95, did you have any contact 
with him? Was there any interaction between you and him?”  
AH:  “No I didn’t.” 
MR:   “How should a journalist trust a source like him?” 
AH:  “First, you need to complete extensive interviews, focussing on small 
details. Second, understand the person’s motives. Third, check whatever 
you can...background, bank account, and any other details.” 
MR:  “Did Morrow want anything from you and Beresford? Money or 
protection?” 
AH:  “He only asked to be kept anonymous.” 
MR:  “Morrow is still trapped in exile; he tried several times to get 
indemnity from prosecution in SA, because of the breach of the 
Official Secrets Act. Did he ask for any help from you during this 
process?” 
AH:  “I seem to remember that he told us what he was doing, but he didn’t ask 
us directly for help. He missed the cut off for the TRC... and you also had 
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to say you were part of a political party... which he wasn’t. It was a 
problem for people.” 
Harber did also mention that the working relationship with the Guardian newspaper 
was necessary, for the protection of the Weekly Mail. 
AH:  “I think understanding that working with the Guardian was often done to 
protect ourselves, when we felt we were vulnerable. We sometimes gave 
them the story first and then report that it came from the Guardian. Or 
sometimes report it simultaneously. That would give us protection.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70 
 
8. FINDINGS  
8.1. Introduction 
The central issue in this study is: how did the journalists conduct themselves in their 
interaction with their sources, and what yardstick do we weigh that conduct against? 
That yardstick is the Press Code, or the Code of Ethics and conduct for the South 
African print and online media, the latest version of which was published in January 
2016. What has emerged in this study is that due to the historical context and legal 
framework under which the media was operating at the time, there were ethical and 
practical challenges faced by the journalists in both the “Vlakplaas” and 
“Inkathagate” cases.  
 
8.2. Libertarian theory & the South African Context 
From a normative perspective this study reveals the role of the journalist in South 
African society during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Normative theory looks at how 
and what the media publish as matters of public concern, as well as what the social 
responsibilities of the media are.  This study looks at what kind of reporting Pauw 
and Harber were involved in at the time. Both journalists were part of the “alternative 
media” (as opposed to the mainstream media) in South Africa, which was 
responsible for much of the journalism that was critical of apartheid.  
 
One of the key findings in “Vlakplaas” story was that it was precipitated by the 
particular context of South African life that the alternative press of the time was intent 
on exposing: the brutalities perpetrated by the state and its security establishment, in 
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a vain attempt to cling to power. Pauw said that he and Max du Preez started Vrye 
Weekblad in October 1988, and that it was a real battle for the newspaper’s survival, 
since du Preez “was charged time and time again under security legislation”. Pauw 
pursued the publication of the Vlakplaas story after a series of deadly attacks on left-
wing political activists, as Pauw stated: “On the 1st of May 1989, David Webster was 
assassinated… and after that...I went to Max and said to him we have to go and 
speak to Coetzee again and see what we could do. Then I went back to Coetzee...”  
 
It is clear that both stories fit into the normative framework of media theory, which 
places “emphasis on the maximum independence of the media, consistent with its 
obligations to society” (McQuail, 1987:116). The Weekly Mail and Vrye Weekblad 
were independently owned newspapers that published stories that were clearly 
Libertarian, in that they emphasized “the uncensored access of knowledge to the 
public” (Oosthuizen, 2002: 40-41). 
 
From this study it has emerged that Pauw and Harber were involved in newspapers 
that exercised Libertarian functions, and that these journalists were fulfilling the role 
of socially responsible journalists. Although there were restrictions imposed on them, 
these journalists were intent on reporting the truth, and on seeking ‘maximum 
independence of the media’, free from state control. They were intent on acting on 
their ‘obligations to society’, and Pauw and Max du Preez took risks because they 
believed in themselves and their role as journalists of the free press.  
 
Exposing apartheid’s subversive activities whilst supporting the broad liberation anti-
apartheid movement was what motivated these journalists and newspaper editors. In 
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the normative/Libertarian sense, the journalists were focussed on exposing ‘matters 
of public concern’, issues that are perceived to be ‘in the public interest’. Both sets of 
journalists reiterated that they published the stories to expose wrongdoing on the 
part of the apartheid government and its agents. The draconian laws of the State of 
Emergency, imposed by the South African Government from 1985 onwards, did not 
deter Pauw and Vrye Weekblad. Pauw said that he had no moral and ethical 
dilemmas about publishing the Vlakplaas story. 
 
By performing a normative function through publishing that largely exposed the 
South African government’s repressive tactics, alternative newspapers were 
vulnerable to attack from the state and its agencies. It was a reality at the time that 
apartheid spies were used to infiltrate newsrooms and pretend to be sources and 
whistleblowers. There was the real possibility that Harber and Beresford were being 
set up by reactionary forces or agents of the South African government.  
Harber also revealed that establishing an informal working relationship with the UK’s 
Guardian newspaper was done, in order to protect the Weekly Mail in South Africa. 
He revealed that he would sometimes “give the story first to the Guardian, and then 
report that it came from the Guardian.” Or sometimes the two newspapers would 
report on a story simultaneously, in order to give the Weekly Mail some protection 
from the South African authorities. 
Significantly, there was also a shift in the South African socio-political context after 
1990, when the ANC was unbanned, and the move towards a negotiated political 
dispensation was initiated. This ultimately led to the demise of apartheid, and the 
birth of democracy, which also caused a shrinking of the gap between the 
Mainstream newspapers and the Alternative Press in South Africa. Harber pointed 
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out that “there were areas before 1990 that only the Alternative press covered, and 
after 1990, the Mainstream press began to move into those areas too. What had 
differentiated the Alternative media was eroded, and at the same time a lot of the 
funding for the Alternative media was falling away. This meant that papers like 
Weekly Mail had a growing crisis of identity, such as how to manage financially.”  
Arising from Black, Steele and Barney’s handbook, ‘”Doing ethics in journalism”, one 
of the guiding principles for the journalist is “Seek truth and report it as fully as 
possible” (Kruger (2004: 14). In utilising this principle of truth seeking, Pauw and 
Harber’s conduct in these two stories exemplifies the role of the media and the 
journalist’s need to break that “give voice to the voiceless” and “hold the powerful 
accountable” (Kruger 2004: 14), which is in keeping with the core of Libertarian 
theory of the media. 
 
8.3. Journalistic Ethics 
In an examination of Pauw and Harber’s conduct in their interaction with their 
sources, there are several ethical issues that have surfaced. Let us examine the 
broader ethical principles of truthfulness, accuracy, fairness, objectivity, impartiality, 
and public accountability.  
 
Telling the truth 
The ethical principles of Truthfulness, Accuracy and Fairness are all linked to the 
journalistic guiding principle of “truth-telling”. When journalists seek to “tell the truth” 
about a particular story, they need to be accurate about the facts concerned. They 
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also need to conduct themselves with fairness, both to the source and the story, in 
order to be truthful in their reporting. In an attempt to seek the truth and report it as 
fully as possible, journalists need to be “honest, fair and courageous in gathering, 
reporting and interpreting accurate information” (Kruger 2004: 14).  
In both the Inkathagate and Vlakplaas stories, the journalists made honest attempts 
to seek the truth. Verification of the information in the Inkathagate story, because it 
came from an anonymous source, was vital for accuracy and truthfulness. This is 
borne out in Harber’s interview, in which he states: “there was an account, name and 
number... it wasn’t IFP, but we did check that the account existed. We did the 
verification”. 
In order to achieve the principles of accuracy and truthfulness, in the Vlakplaas story, 
Pauw also needed to verify his source’s (Coetzee’s) information. He could not have 
been able to publish the story, otherwise. Pauw did say that “it was the revelations of 
Almond Nofemela on death row on 20 Oct 1989, through the Lawyers for Human 
Rights, which gave the story confirmation. Coetzee and I had left the country a few 
days later. And that was a confirmation, (because) Nofemela was another source.” 
 
And part of the principle of truth-seeking, are the notions of ‘giving voice to the 
voiceless’ as well as ‘holding the powerful accountable’. These notions are evident in 
both case studies. For instance, Inkathagate exposed the lengths to which the 
apartheid South African government (the powerful) would go, in order to influence 
the outcome of future negotiations with the ANC, by funding and strengthening the 
hand of the IFP, a party in direct conflict with the ANC. Harber said the Inkathagate 
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story “had a fundamental effect on the way in which the IFP was seen and 
positioned.” 
The Vlakplaas expose’ was also aimed at “giving a voice to the voiceless” and 
“holding the powerful accountable”. The search for truth was what motivated Pauw, 
and in order to tell a truthful, fair and accurate story, he needed to first believe that 
what his source told him was in fact true, and speaking in retrospect, Pauw said “If 
you look back today at what Coetzee had said to me in 1989…every single thing he 
said was the truth…there wasn’t a single thing that he lied about.” 
 
Public accountability 
From an ideological perspective, Pauw and Harber sought to be independent 
journalists, fighting against the restrictions of the Apartheid government’s ideology. 
Through their larger body of work, both journalists sought to establish freedom of 
expression, and press freedom, in a harsh political and social landscape like South 
Africa of the late 1980s. Writing for newspapers that were clearly regarded as “the 
alternative press”, both journalists were actively independent. Pauw and Harber were 
also guided by the ethical norm of ‘public accountability’, which relates to the extent 
to which, they “should be prepared to explain and answer for their work, to their 
audiences and the public at large” (Kruger, 2004: 13). 
 
Objectivity and impartiality 
However, when examining the ethical principles of objectivity and impartiality, linked 
to the broad guiding principle of journalistic independence, both case studies show 
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evidence of these, but to varying degrees. The SA Press Code is clear about 
independence and conflicts of interest:  
“The media shall not allow commercial, political, personal or other non-
professional considerations to influence or slant reporting. Conflicts of interest 
must be avoided, as well as arrangements or practices that could lead 
audiences to doubt the media’s independence and professionalism”. 
For Jacques Pauw, and the Vlakplaas story especially, the question of journalistic 
independence is crucial.  Coetzee revealed that the African National Congress, and 
not the Vrye Weekblad newspaper, paid for the two of them to leave the country. The 
fact that the African National Congress, an organisation in exile that was banned in 
South Africa and had been operating underground with offices in several other 
countries paid for Coetzee to be flown out of South Africa, and not the Vrye 
Weekblad newspaper, is in conflict with the issue of journalistic independence. One 
of the guiding principles for acting independently is that the journalist must “remain 
free of associations and activities that may compromise your integrity and damage 
your credibility” (Kruger, 2007: 14).  If his newspaper had paid for the trip, then Pauw 
would have been said to be acting independently, in covering the story. But that was 
certainly not the case here. Pauw had used money from a banned liberation 
organisation to secure the interview with Coetzee, an act that clearly goes against 
the notion of journalistic independence. This is clearly a conflict of interest in the 
Vlakplaas story, for the journalist. There was a clash between what is ethically and 
professionally the right thing to do, and outside interests and pressures. Pauw’s 
reporting on this story was influenced by the interests of those who paid the bills for 
the story to be told, i.e. the ANC.  
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There is also the issue of whether the ANC-funded trip to Mauritius was regarded as 
a “gift” to Pauw from the liberation movement, for ensuring that the Vlakplaas story 
received maximum global exposure. This issue is clearly an ethical grey area for 
Pauw and the Vlakplaas story, and brings into focus the question of the credibility of 
the journalist and his newspaper. This is in conflict with the SA Press code which 
states:  
“The media shall  
- not accept a bribe, gift or any other benefit where this is intended or likely to 
influence coverage; 
- indicate clearly when an outside organisation has contributed to the cost of 
newsgathering”  
The Vrye Weekblad did not clearly declare that an outside organisation had 
contributed to the cost of the newsgathering, in the Vlakplaas story. 
 
Source-handling 
Having dealt with the broad ethical principles outlined above, we now move on to the 
issue of source-handling, and shall examine the conduct of the journalists in their 
interaction with the sources. The SA Press code clearly defines the role of the 
journalist/media in dealing with confidential and anonymous sources:  
“The Media shall:  
- Protect confidential sources of information - the protection of sources is a 
basic principle in a democratic and free society;  
- avoid the use of anonymous sources unless there is no other way to deal 
with a story. Care should be taken to corroborate the information; and  
78 
 
- not publish information which constitutes a breach of confidence, unless the 
public interest dictates otherwise.” 
And Kruger’s three elements of source-handling provide us with useful analytical 
tools: “we should deal with them honestly... show them consideration, and maintain a 
professional distance” (2004: 174-5).  
 
Honesty 
Firstly, did Pauw and Harber handle their respective sources honestly? Were the 
journalists open with them, about who they were, and their intentions as journalists? 
In the Inkathagate case, Harber received a batch of documents from his 
correspondent David Beresford in London, after they were handed to him by 
whistleblower Brian Morrow. Harber and Beresford did not have to declare their 
‘honest’ intentions to Morrow, as they did not seek him out. It was Morrow who went 
in search of the journalists, in order to expose the story. But the journalists here did 
have to apply the principle of honesty to the facts presented, in order to arrive at the 
truth of the story.  
Similarly, in the Vlakplaas story, the whistleblower (Coetzee) came to the journalist 
(Pauw) with information that he needed to have exposed. Coetzee had already 
approached other journalists with the same story, and revealed that he had struggled 
to convince reporters to take his revelations about Vlakplaas seriously. Coetzee did 
finally find sympathetic listeners in journalists Jacques Pauw and Martin Welz, but it 
took Pauw four more years to publish the story. He had to wait for verification of 
Coetzee’s tales, which under the circumstances was proving difficult. Nofemela’s 
confession provided the verification.  
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Interestingly, the decision to publish the story happened at a time when the 
newspaper Vrye Weekblad was taking some strain in order to survive. So the ethical 
issue that arises here is: was Pauw honest with Coetzee about his intentions to 
publish the story, and what were those intentions? One possibility was that Pauw 
and his newspaper were more concerned with using the massive Vlakplaas story for 
the newspaper’s survival, and hence may not have been completely honest with 
Coetzee about his intentions to publish the story at that particular moment in history.  
 
Payment for information 
Another key ethical issue was whether either of the sources received any payment 
for their stories. The SA Press codes states:  
“The media shall avoid shady journalism in which informants are paid to 
induce them to give the information, particularly when they are criminals - 
except where the material concerned ought to be published in the public 
interest and the payment is necessary for this to be done.” 
The interviews have revealed that that neither Coetzee nor Morrow received any 
monetary payment from the journalists or their newspapers. Morrow also confirmed 
that he received no payment from Beresford or the newspaper for the documents he 
gave them. 
But there were ethical implications that arose when Pauw took Coetzee to Mauritius, 
in order to carry out the complete interview with his source, before sending him off to 
London to meet with the ANC. What was the reason for choosing Mauritius (and not 
London) as a location for Coetzee to ‘spill the beans’ on Vlakplaas? From an ethical 
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perspective, it is also possible that this Mauritius trip was some sort of ‘payment’ (or 
pay-off) to Coetzee for his complete and unadulterated revelations to Pauw. On the 
other hand, perhaps the Indian Ocean Island was selected because it may have 
provided a safe and conducive environment (as opposed to the United Kingdom, 
with the inherent dangerous possibility that Coetzee could be assassinated by 
apartheid agents) for Coetzee to completely ‘open up’ his memory to the journalist.  
Interestingly, Coetzee’s interview was loaded with resentment towards Pauw: 
“Jacques paid fuck all...he just rose to fame...sitting on his fuckin’ backside...doing 
fuck all every six seconds... just wants the story... spill the beans... and add some 
gruesome action”. Such resentment may point to Coetzee’s disillusionment towards 
the journalist, and may be due to their interaction, which according to Coetzee was 
far from harmonious. 
 
Journalists are ethically bound to protect confidential sources of information.  
Let us look at what steps Pauw and Harber took to protect their sources from harm. 
A critical ethical issue for Pauw was the protection of his source: he had to handle 
Coetzee with care, and provide him with protection for his life. Due to the fact that 
Coetzee had confessed to killing several activists, there were real fears of reprisals 
from both the underground freedom movement as well as the security forces. And 
there were ethical implications in the fact that Pauw willingly handed his source over 
to Coetzee’s enemy, the ANC in exile in London. After doing the interview with 
Coetzee in Mauritius over 6 days, Pauw went back to South Africa, alone. Coetzee 
went off to London, alone. It would have been more ethical for Pauw to have 
accompanied Coetzee to London, to ensure that he was not harmed. Pauw did not 
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foresee the possibility that the ANC could have rejected Coetzee’s presentation to 
them as feeble, or as a desperate act of survival from an apartheid hit-man, and 
hence could have had his source killed in London as an act of retribution. By placing 
his source in a situation of grave danger, Pauw acted against the ethical principle of 
‘minimising harm’.  Investigative reporter Sam Sole once spoke of the unusual 
circumstance of losing his source through assassination: “My worst experience as a 
journalist was to have a source assassinated, because the source had a lot more 
information than he provided for me, but he wanted to test the waters. He did not 
want his identity revealed, but of course all the people he was involved with did not 
have much difficulty to work out who he was and he got wiped out. So maybe as a 
source it’s better that you don’t feed things in dribs and drabs, so that there’s no 
reason to kill you, or you take the risk rather of using your name so that any action 
that is taken against you subsequently is very clearly in response to your whistle-
blowing action. That’s the other side of source protection” (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 
Investigative Journalism Manual: 9).  
But whilst the current SA Press code states “the protection of sources is a basic 
principle in a democratic and free society”, Pauw could well argue that at the time of 
the publishing of the Vlakplaas story, South Africa was certainly not “a democratic 
and free society”. 
In the case of Brian Morrow, due to his Inkathagate revelations, the whistleblower 
faced prosecution in South Africa, for having breached the Official Secrets Act. This 
prevented him from returning to South Africa permanently. Morrow feels aggrieved 
that he never received amnesty from prosecution, given the magnitude of his 
revelations, and the effect it had on this country’s history. This is proof that he wasn’t 
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fully afforded protection.  As an act of desperation, Morrow went back to David 
Beresford in 1995, to reveal his identity to him and the world.  
 
Professional distance 
In the Inkathagate story, Harber and Beresford clearly maintained a professional 
distance from their source. Beresford met Morrow face to face, received the 
documents, and sent them to Harber for verification and to publish the story. Morrow 
remained in London and did not contact Harber again. There was no ongoing 
interaction between the journalists and Morrow, and certainly no evidence of any 
relationship between source and journalist. The only time Morrow went back to 
Beresford was in 1995 when he asked for some help in securing amnesty from the 
South African government.  
During the course of his ongoing (almost four-year long) interaction with Coetzee, 
Pauw had to walk a fine line in terms of ethics, as he sought to cultivate his source, 
and he said that he did not count Coetzee as a friend. Pauw stated that despite 
spending large amounts of time in close proximity with his source, he did not allow 
himself to become too close to Coetzee. Pauw did not develop a friendship or any 
other relationship with his source.  
In his description of Jacques Pauw, and of his relationship with him, Coetzee 
revealed in his interview that he was not quite happy with Pauw’s conduct as a 
journalist. There seemed to have been some lingering bitterness that Coetzee was 
harbouring towards Pauw.  
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Coetzee:  “Martin (Welz) was not a drinker, at all, so we never met at a pub. 
He was respectable and respected. Not like Jacques, who just 
wanted a story. Jacques loved his liquor, just like me. So we met at 
pubs, etc. They all think that if they make you drunk, you’ll spill the 
beans more easily. Jacques was fond of buying a lunch and so on.” 
MR:  “How would you describe your relationship with Jacques 
Pauw?” 
Coetzee:  “There’s no relationship. He’s just a guy hunting a story, for his own 
interest. He just feathers his own nest... furthers his own interest... 
an orthodox planner for his own interest.”  
Coetzee’s description of Pauw clearly reveals an apparent contempt which the 
source seems to have towards the journalist. Coetzee’s words to describe Pauw: 
“feathers his own nest”, “furthers his own interest”, “orthodox planner”...all reveal that 
Coetzee had scant regard for Pauw and his intentions. Coetzee’s contempt for Pauw 
may have arisen from the manner in which Pauw handled him as a source. Perhaps 
the source felt that he was being used by the journalist to tell the story, and once he 
had done so, the journalist discarded him. On the other hand, perhaps Pauw’s 
handling of Coetzee was coloured by the fact that the source was a self-confessed 
killer, and that despite the proximity they shared, the journalist did maintain a 
psychological (and professional) distance from the source.  
Coetzee has confirmed that Pauw did not cultivate a relationship with him. But did 
Pauw stretch his use of some tactics to cultivate Coetzee as a source? Having 
regular contact with your source, buying lunches and drinks, is all part of cultivating a 
source, but does this mean that Pauw’s conduct was bordering on the unethical? 
Pauw has denied this. 
 
84 
 
Minimise harm 
And finally, there is the issue of what does a journalist do if he is given information 
that could save a person’s life? Coetzee insisted during the interview that he had 
asked Pauw to warn the lawyer, Bheki Mlangeni that he will receive a parcel that 
could be a bomb. Pauw had failed to do so. Mlangeni was killed by the bomb, and 
his death could have been avoided. What are the ethical implications for Pauw in this 
matter? As a journalist he is expected to act ethically to save lives, especially if he is 
privy to information that indicates that someone’s life is in imminent danger; he is 
ethically bound to ‘minimise harm’. Having established that he trusted every word 
that Coetzee had spoken, Pauw ought to have believed Coetzee and sprung into 
action to warn Mlangeni of the danger. The fact that this did not happen raises 
ethical issues for Pauw. 
 
Recommendations  
Based on the above findings on the two case studies, the strengthening of 
journalistic ethics has become highly imperative in the current South African and 
global context. Faced with a plethora of leaked information, from both reliable and 
fake sources, today’s journalists can learn from the ethical conduct (or lack thereof) 
that these two case studies have revealed. They must question the motives and 
origins of any information they are presented with, and be wary of the practice of 
“spin-doctoring”, which could come from any source. Given the current political 
climate in South Africa, in which the ruling party the ANC is undergoing a succession 
battle, journalists need to be wary of being co-opted into factional politics. They need 
to examine documents methodically, evaluate their sources through the two-source 
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verification process, and seek to arrive at an independent assessment of source and 
story. Journalists must also be wary of those practices that are destroying ethical 
journalism, such as conflicts of interest, lack of objectivity, bias, fake news, legal 
restrictions, invasion of privacy, and other threats to the freedom of the press. They 
must avoid over-zealousness in seeking to make a scoop. 
Journalists must ensure that they act firmly according to the Press Code or Code of 
Conduct for the South African Media. They must uphold and maintain the 
independence and professionalism of their media; avoid conflicts of interest; prevent 
political, commercial, personal or other non-professional considerations from 
influencing their reporting; not accept bribes or gifts, in any form. Journalists must 
take great care to strengthen their ethical practices; they must abide by the broader 
ethical principles of truthfulness, accuracy, fairness, objectivity, impartiality, and 
public accountability.  
Journalists must offer protection to their confidential sources of information; ensure 
that they corroborate or verify their story; and avoid the use of anonymous sources 
unless there is no other way to tell the story. The reporter must have a clear 
understanding that the Press Code protects the interests of the reader/viewer, the 
source (confidentiality), as well as the subject of the story (privacy).  
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9. CONCLUSION 
This research report has looked at the ethical treatment of two whistleblowers by the 
respective journalists in the two case studies, “Vlakplaas” and “Inkathagate”. Using 
the Libertarian theory as a normative framework to measure the journalists’ conduct, 
it is able to conclude that under extremely difficult conditions, both from a legislative 
and practical perspective, the respective journalists did attempt to apply journalistic 
ethics in their conduct to secure the stories, as well as the safety of their sources. 
From an ethical perspective, both Pauw and Harber followed the broad ethical 
principles of truthfulness, accuracy, objectivity, impartiality, fairness, and public 
accountability. This study has also weighed the conduct of both journalists against 
Kruger’s three elements of source-handling: honesty, consideration and professional 
distance.  
 
There were a few grey areas in terms of ethical lapses, especially for Jacques Pauw 
in the Vlakplaas story. What can be learnt from Pauw’s conduct is that the 
strengthening of ethical journalism is essential for the enhancing public respect for 
the profession itself. Over-zealousness in seeking to make a scoop can lead to 
ethical lapses. The overriding concern for both Pauw and Harber was that their 
stories were written for an interested public, and that they provided stories in their 
respective “alternative” newspapers, from an anti-apartheid perspective.   
 
One of the guiding principles for the journalist is ‘Seek truth and report it as fully as 
possible’ (Kruger (2004: 14). In utilising this principle of truth seeking, Pauw and 
Harber’s conduct in these two stories exemplifies the role of the media and the 
journalist’s need to break story that ‘”give voice to the voiceless” and “hold the 
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powerful accountable” (Kruger 2004: 14), which is in keeping with the ideals of the 
Libertarian theory of the media.  
As for the overall impact of such investigative journalism: here’s an appropriate 
statement taken from the proceedings at the Institutional Hearing into the Media, in 
September 1997, in Johannesburg: “Jon Qwelane, the most severe critic of the 
mainstream media, acknowledged that it was the English-language newspapers 
whose journalists demonstrated ‘periodic flashes of courage and brilliance’ by 
exposing the gross injustices perpetrated by the system of apartheid. He cited 
examples such as reporting on the inhumane conditions in South Africa's prisons, 
the Information ('Info') scandal, the unmasking of the Civil Co-operation Bureau 
(CCB) and the exposure of Vlakplaas.” (From 
http://www.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/memory).   
 
This study has also brought into focus the need for strengthening ethics in 
journalism. It has raised questions about what may be killing ethical journalism: what 
are the threats to journalistic ethics, such as conflicts of interest, lack of objectivity, 
bias, legal restrictions, invasion of privacy and over-zealousness.   
 
This study has also highlighted the need to look at ways to raise the standards of 
ethical journalism and encourage journalists to adopt better ethical practices. In so 
doing, journalism as a profession will benefit by enhancing public respect for it and 
giving its members more reason to place confidence in each other’s integrity.  
As Wasserman points out: “Journalists do not readily perceive the discussion of 
ethics as a priority when faced with the pressure of deadlines, economic realities and 
huge workloads. They often also have a dislike of anything resembling academic 
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pipe dreams. In their world, practice dictates, the Big Story does not allow itself to 
become ensnared in moral quandaries and the front page awaits. Such an argument 
often stems from the perception that media ethics is essentially a sermonising 
business, far removed from everyday realities. On the contrary - ethics has 
everything to do with reality. Journalists do not work in a vacuum, but in a society in 
which they can cause great harm but also have a great influence” (2002: 142). 
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